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MIDDLE-INCOME PEERS AS EDUCATIONAL 
RESOURCES AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
RIGHT TO EQUAL ACCESS 
Derek W. Black* 
Abstract: Concentrated poverty in public schools continues to be a lead-
ing determinate of the educational opportunities that minority students 
receive. Since the effective end of mandatory desegregation, advocates 
have lacked legal tools to address it. As an alternative, some advocates and 
scholars have attempted to incorporate the concerns of concentrated pov-
erty and racial segregation into educational litigation under state constitu-
tions, but these efforts have been slow to take hold. Thus, all that has re-
mained for students in poor and minority schools is the hope that school 
finance litigation could direct sufficient resources to mitigate their plight. 
This Article offers another solution. Rather than simply importing con-
cepts from federal desegregation into school finance, this Article articu-
lates a unique theory of equal access to middle-income peers that is solidly 
grounded in state constitutional and school finance principles. In particu-
lar, it conceptualizes middle-income students as one of the educational re-
sources that school districts allocate. As such, school finance principles of 
strategic and equitable distribution of resources apply. This theory is nar-
rower than others and would not directly challenge segregation that exists 
between districts, but its narrowness is its doctrinal strength. Moreover, an 
empirical study of district-level practices reveals that conventional wisdom 
may have underestimated the level of inequality that occurs within dis-
tricts. The racial inequality in access to middle-income peers within dis-
tricts is vast and corresponds with dramatic shifts in achievement gaps, a 
core indicator of constitutional violations in school finance litigation. 
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Introduction 
 Mandatory racial desegregation has almost run its course,1 volun-
tary desegregation is subject to significant constitutional limits,2 and 
school finance litigation is caught between progressive legal doctrine 
and empty state coffers.3 Unfortunately, none of these efforts has come 
close to reaching its full potential before experiencing a serious set-
back.4 Schools are as racially segregated today as they were four dec-
ades ago,5 and predominantly poor and minority schools routinely re-
ceive thousands of dollars less per pupil than their suburban 
counterparts.6 In short, today’s schools are both segregated and un-
equal.7 Given the severity of today’s segregation and inequality, a racial 
achievement gap between whites and minorities equivalent to two years 
of learning by the eighth grade is not entirely surprising.8 What is sur-
prising is the dearth of policy and legal solutions to the problem. 
 Over the last decade, scholars have called for a “fourth wave” of 
school finance litigation that would combine racial desegregation and 
school finance into a single movement.9 The idea has been that racial 
                                                                                                                      
 
1 Wendy Parker, The Future of School Desegregation, 94 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1157, 1158–59 
(2000) (recounting, as early as 2000, the various indicators that desegregation had come to 
an end, but empirically demonstrating that numerous consent decrees were still in place 
and enforced). 
2 See, e.g, Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 710–
11 (2007). 
3 See John Dayton et al., Brother, Can You Spare a Dime? Contemplating the Future of School 
Funding Litigation in Tough Economic Times, 258 Educ. L. Rep. 937, 954 (2010) (“[C]ourts 
will face very difficult challenges in attempting to bridge the growing gap between consti-
tutional ideals and fiscal realities if the General Assembly lacks public support and suffi-
cient resources to fund remedies for school funding inequities and inadequacies.”). 
4 See Derek W. Black, The Fatal Flaws of Education Reform: Causal Gaps and Doctrinal 
Incoherence 2–3 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
5 Gary Orfield & Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., 
Brown at 50: King’s Dream or Plessy’s Nightmare? 19 tbl.7 (2004) (showing a reseg-
regation of schools back to 1970s levels). 
6 Ross Wiener & Eli Pristoop, How States Shortchange the Districts That Need the Most Help, 
in Funding Gaps (Educ. Trust, D.C.), Jan. 1, 2006, at 5, 7 tbl.4. 
7 Robert A. Garda, Jr., Coming Full Circle: The Journey from Separate but Equal to Separate 
and Unequal Schools, 2 Duke J. Const. L. & Pub. Pol’y 1, 53 (2007) (arguing that the dis-
tinction between Plessey v. Ferguson’s enforced segregation and today’s voluntary segrega-
tion “will not make a practical difference to our students, however, as our separate schools 
will continue to produce disparate educational opportunities for our poor and minority 
students” and concluding that school finance litigation, for instance, will counteract it). 
8 See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The Condition of Education 2009, App. A, 
at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-2 (2009). 
9 See, e.g., Molly S. McUsic, The Future of Brown v. Board of Education: Economic Integration 
of the Public Schools, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1334, 1355–56 (2004); James E. Ryan, Schools, Race, and 
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and/or poverty isolation deprives students of their state constitutional 
right to an equal or adequate education.10 As of yet, however, this the-
ory has been slow to spread beyond the one court opinion that recog-
nized it in 1996.11 In fact, only a handful of advocates have even at-
tempted to pursue integration through school finance claims.12 
Although the incorporation of integration into state-based concepts of 
equity or adequacy could potentially resolve some of the limitations de-
segregation experienced in federal court,13 the strategy may attempt to 
prove too much. Including racial diversity within the concept of an 
equal or adequate education could effectively mean that schools across 
the board must be integrated. Even if the right was merely to a diverse 
environment rather than the racial balance typically pursued in federal 
desegregation,14 an affirmative right to diversity under state constitu-
tions would have a wider reach than federal desegregation, as an af-
firmative right would apply to all racial isolation regardless of its legal 
cause or geographic location. The practical result of an affirmative right 
to diversity or a prohibition on poverty isolation would be significant 
desegregation across school district lines.15 In these respects, state-based 
integration claims would challenge the institutional authority and capac-
ity of state courts at a level approaching that of federal desegregation.16 
These realities, although not a legitimate basis alone for courts to reject 
the claims, may have dissuaded integration theories in school finance 
litigation. 
                                                                                                                      
Money, 109 Yale L.J. 249, 307–10 (1999); Christopher E. Adams, Comment, Is Economic Inte-
gration the Fourth Wave in School Finance Litigation?, 56 Emory L.J. 1613, 1642 (2007). 
10 Ryan, supra note 9, at 308. 
11 Sheff v. O’Neill, 678 A.2d 1267, 1270–71 (Conn. 1996); see Goodwin Liu, The Parted 
Paths of School Desegregation and School Finance Litigation, 24 Law & Ineq. 81, 82–83 (2006). 
12 See Hoke Cnty. Bd. of Educ. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 397 (N.C. 2004); Paynter v. 
State, 797 N.E.2d 1225, 1226–27 (N.Y. 2003); Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1271; Class Action Com-
plaint at 13–14, NAACP v. Minnesota, No. 27-CV-95-014800 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 19, 1995) 
[hereinafter NAACP Complaint]. 
13 See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 744–45 (1974) (limiting desegregation to 
school district boundaries); Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 205–06 (1973) (limiting 
desegregation remedies to acts of intentional segregation). 
14 See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 25–28 (1971) 
(indicating that statistical disparities from the overall district average are a starting point of 
analysis, and affirming the reassignment of students to different schools through altered 
attendance zones). 
15 See, e.g., Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290–91; see also Aaron J. Saiger, The School District Boundary 
Problem, 42 Urb. Law. 495, 495–96 (2010). 
16 See James K. Gooch, Fenced In: Why Sheff v. O’Neill Can’t Save Connecticut’s Inner City 
Students, 22 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 395, 438–40 (2004) (discussing how practicalities, particu-
larly crossing the school district boundary, has created serious opposition to the remedy in 
Sheff). 
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 Not all integrative approaches to school finance, however, would 
necessarily confront these practical limitations or require significant 
expansions of precedent. In particular, this Article articulates a consti-
tutional right to equal access to middle-income peers that operates 
most directly at the school district level and carries with it significant 
conceptual precedent. The theory is not that students can compel a 
state or school district to create racially or socioeconomically integrated 
environments where they would not otherwise exist, but that past 
school finance decisions provide a basis on which to constrain the dis-
tribution of middle-income students within individual school districts. 
This constitutional right flows from four basic principles, three of 
which already find solid support. First, although routinely referred to as 
school finance litigation because additional funding has been the pri-
mary remedy litigants have requested, the core holdings in school fi-
nance litigation establish constitutional guarantees of equal and quality 
educational opportunity that are about far more than money.17 In fact, 
the constitutional violation in most cases is not funding inequity itself, 
but the substantive and outcome-based inequities that can result from 
funding inequity.18 Second, constitutional duties to deliver a quality or 
an equal education extend to districts in addition to states.19 To reason 
otherwise would afford districts wider constitutional latitude than 
states, even though the primary constitutional power and duty itself is 
vested with the state. Third, educational constitutional duties include 
an obligation of strategic and equitable resource distribution.20 Courts 
have recognized that an abundance of resources will not guarantee eq-
uitable or quality educational opportunities without a careful and fair 
distribution of those resources. This principle is embodied in the very 
language of some states’ educational clauses.21 
 The final conceptual step in a constitutional right to middle-
income peers, however, is not as simple as the first three. It requires a 
                                                                                                                      
17 See Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1290–91; Rose v. Council for Better Educ., Inc., 790 S.W.2d 186, 
212 (Ky. 1989) (defining the substance of the constitutional right as an adequate educa-
tion and describing it in noneconomic terms). 
18 See, e.g., Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997). 
19 See infra notes 100–127 and accompanying text. 
20 See, e.g., Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 189 (requiring an “efficient” school system); Hoke Cnty., 599 
S.E.2d at 388–90 (requiring strategic allocation of resources); Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. 
McWherter, 894 S.W.2d 734, 738–39 (Tenn. 1995) (sanctioning the state’s mandate of fiscal 
responsibility on local districts); Pauley v. Kelly, 255 S.E.2d 859, 878 (W. Va. 1979) (prohibit-
ing resource waste and duplication and mandating efficiency). 
21 See Ky. Const. § 183 (mandating that the state “provide for an efficient system of 
common schools throughout the state”). 
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reorientation in thinking about educational resources and segregation. 
Legally relevant educational resources tend to be conceptualized as 
those things schools can buy, develop, or create that have positive im-
pacts on educational outcomes.22 This conceptualization is overly nar-
row and ignores reality. Schools enjoy any number of important re-
sources that they do not and cannot buy, such as the communities, 
public services, partnerships, and private industries surrounding them 
that support the educational environment. The more important and 
direct noneconomic resource, however, is a school district’s middle-
income students. Common sense and social science indicate that stu-
dents learn not only from their teachers, but also from their peers.23 
Middle-income peers (and their parents), in particular, bring a host of 
experiences, outside learning, and high expectations to schools that 
positively impact other students in their schools.24 The percentage of 
middle income students in a school can be more important to the edu-
cational achievement of all students in that school than any other re-
source or factor.25 Students, regardless of their individual socioeco-
nomic status or race, achieve at higher levels in predominantly middle 
class schools and at lower levels in predominantly poor schools.26 In 
short, although not a traditional resource that schools can buy, middle-
income students are an invaluable resource that exerts significant in-
fluence on the achievement of all students. 
                                                                                                                      
22 Such a conceptualization is evident through courts’ use of “cost out” studies to de-
sign remedies. William S. Koski, Courthouses vs. Statehouses?, 109 Mich. L. Rev. 923, 939 
(2011) (reviewing Eric A. Hanushek & Alfred A. Lindseth, Schoolhouses, Court-
houses, and Statehouses: Solving the Funding Achievement Puzzle in America’s 
Public Schools (2009)); Benjamin Michael Superfine, New Directions in School Funding 
and Governance: Moving from Politics to Evidence, 98 Ky. L.J. 653, 664–67 (2009). 
23 Richard D. Kahlenberg, All Together Now: Creating Middle-Class Schools 
Through Public School Choice 47–76 (2001). 
24 Id. at 49–58; Myron Orfield, Choice, Equal Protection, and Metropolitan Integration: The 
Hope of the Minneapolis Desegregation Settlement, 24 Law & Ineq. 269, 273 (2006). 
25 See James S. Coleman et al., Dep’t of Health, Educ., & Welfare, Equality of 
Educational Opportunity 21–22 (1966). 
26 Id. at 302–10; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 6; UNC Ctr. for Civil Rights, The 
Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools: A Crucial Consideration in 
Student Assignment Policy 1–4 (2005) [hereinafter Socioeconomic Composition of 
the Public Schools], available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/civilrights/briefs/ 
charlottereport.pdf; Geoffrey D. Borman & Maritza Dowling, Schools and Inequality: A Multi-
level Analysis of Coleman’s Equality of Educational Opportunity Data, 112 Tchrs. C. Rec. 1201, 
1201–02 (2010); McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56; Laura B. Perry & Andrew McConney, 
Does the SES of the School Matter? An Examination of Socioeconomic Status and Student Achieve-
ment Using PISA 2003, 112 Tchrs. C. Rec. 1137, 1137–38 (2010). 
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 Yet, reorienting the concept of educational resources to include 
middle-income students, by itself, is not enough. Courts must also re-
orient their perception of poverty and racial segregation. Poverty and 
racial segregation today are perceived as inevitable, beyond the control 
of states and districts, and natural.27 Of course, it is true that school dis-
tricts have almost no control over the total number of middle-income 
and poor students in their districts, but they have complete control 
over the assignment of those middle-income and poor students who are 
enrolled in their districts. Conventional wisdom over the past two dec-
ades, however, has been to ignore this basic fact and the problem of 
segregation within districts because the most extreme and extensive 
segregation exists between districts.28 Although conventional wisdom 
may be correct in its assessment of inter-district segregation, it does not 
follow that segregation within districts is not occurring or serious.29 
 To the contrary, this Article’s empirical study of access to middle-
income peers reveals that many school districts have the capacity to ex-
pose all students to middle-income environments, but instead deny mi-
norities of the experience. Interestingly, the study also uncovers a pat-
tern of many other school districts doing the opposite by providing 
minority students equal access to middle-income environments. The 
fact that this inequality of access is occurring within the confines of in-
dividual school districts, but not others, demonstrates that the current 
racially and socioeconomically isolated nature of many districts is not 
inevitable. Rather, districts are making choices about how they distrib-
ute valuable resources—too often to the disadvantage of minorities. 
                                                                                                                      
27 See, e.g., Freeman v. Pitts, 503 U.S. 467, 494–95 (1992); Thomas Cnty. NAACP v. City of 
Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 1340, 1358 (M.D. Ga. 2004); see also Martha R. Ma-
honey, Segregation, Whiteness, and Transformation, 143 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1659, 1661–62 (1995) 
(“[R]ace derives much of its power from seeming to be a natural or biological phenomenon 
or, at the very least, a coherent social category. For whites, residential segregation is one of 
the forces giving race a ‘natural’ appearance . . . . The appearance that this is ‘the way things 
are’ . . . tends to make prevailing patterns of race, ethnicity, power, and the distribution of 
privilege appear as features of the natural world.”); john a. powell & Stephen M. Menendian, 
Remaking Law: Moving Beyond Enlightenment Jurisprudence, 54 St. Louis U. L.J. 1035, 1095 
(2010) (reasoning that old decisions such as Milliken v. Bradley have legitimized segregation). 
28 See Sean F. Reardon & John T. Yun, Integrating Neighborhoods, Segregating Schools: The Re-
treat from School Desegregation in the South, 1990–2000, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1563, 1575–80 (2003) 
(discussing the gravity of interdistrict school segregation and its relationship to housing seg-
regation); see also Charles T. Clotfelter, After Brown: The Rise and Retreat of School 
Desegregation 73 tbl.A2.3 (2004) (estimating that sixty-nine percent of segregation in met-
ropolitan areas is due to segregation between districts). 
29 Reardon & Yun, supra note 28, at 1575–81 (indicating that the full extent of school 
segregation is not attributable to residential or inter-district segregation, as student as-
signment policies exacerbate the problem). 
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 Consistent with the literature, this unequal access to middle class 
peers also appears to have consequences for minority students’ aca-
demic achievement. After identifying the varying levels of equitable and 
inequitable access, this Article takes the next step and analyzes whether 
racial inequality in access to middle-income peers correlates with any 
change in the racial achievement gap. It finds that, in general, those dis-
tricts with the most inequitable access for minorities also have the larg-
est achievement gaps, whereas districts that provide minorities the most 
equitable access have the smallest achievement gaps. Thus, this empiri-
cal evidence not only forces a reorientation of how one perceives racial 
inequality in student assignments, but suggests that a widespread pat-
tern of segregative student assignments and large achievement gaps per-
sists that would otherwise be inconsistent with a constitutional right to 
equal access to middle-income peers. 
 This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I recounts past efforts to 
assert segregation-related claims within the context of school finance 
litigation and precedent, as well as the scholarly theories supporting 
and urging the expansion of these efforts.30 Part I concludes by distin-
guishing these past efforts from this Article’s theory and explaining the 
legal and practical advantages of pursuing intra-district claims of un-
equal access to middle-income peers.31 Part II offers a full and detailed 
explanation of the legal precedent and social science evidence that 
would establish a constitutional right to equal access to middle-income 
peers.32 Part III describes the methodology and results of this Article’s 
empirical analysis of racially unequal access to middle-income peers 
and its correlation with changes in the racial achievement gap.33 The 
Article concludes by urging that courts and advocates take the relatively 
small step of ensuring equal treatment in regard to one of school dis-
tricts’ most vital resources. 
I. Past Challenges to Poverty and Race Segregation 
 The doctrinal intersection between state constitutional rights to 
education and the problem of concentrated poverty is relatively under-
developed by courts and scholars. To the extent courts and scholars 
have addressed the issue at all, they have addressed it only in regard to 
segregation between districts, not within them, and the analysis has 
                                                                                                                      
30 See infra notes 34–92 and accompanying text. 
31 See infra notes 34–92 and accompanying text. 
32 See infra notes 93–255 and accompanying text. 
33 See infra notes 256–301 and accompanying text. 
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been preliminary in most respects. A review of the litigation and litera-
ture, however, is helpful in identifying the challenges of pursuing inte-
gration theories through state constitutions and why past efforts have 
not yet spread widely. For both practical and doctrinal reasons, these 
prior theories have faced an uphill battle. But a theory of equal access 
to middle-income peers within school districts is distinct from these 
past efforts in key respects. First, by definition, this Article’s theory does 
not challenge historical school district lines, which have proven to be 
sticking points elsewhere. By focusing on current intra-district patterns, 
this Article avoids important political, practical, and legal impediments. 
Second, recognizing a right to equal access to middle-income peers 
does not require the large expansion of precedent that other theories 
might. Rather, it arguably only requires the application of existing 
precedent to current decisions and patterns within districts. In short, 
notwithstanding the past, this Article offers a viable strategy for address-
ing certain forms of segregation through state educational rights. 
A. Litigation Strategies and Outcomes 
 Racial segregation and concentrated poverty have previously been 
addressed almost exclusively through federal school desegregation liti-
gation.34 In most school districts, racial desegregation also led to socio-
economic desegregation.35 As a result, pursuing separate legal theories 
to address socioeconomic segregation on its own was never a pressing 
concern, particularly during the period when courts were receptive to 
racial desegregation claims.36 Changes in federal law, however, eventu-
ally limited advocates’ ability to pursue racial desegregation claims.37 In 
the 1973 case Keyes v. School District No. 1, the U.S. Supreme Court held 
that plaintiffs must establish intentional segregation to justify school 
desegregation remedies.38 The significance of this requirement only 
grew as time passed and the connection between current segregation 
                                                                                                                      
34 See infra notes 35–69 and accompanying text. 
35 Much of the academic benefit of racial desegregation was attributable to the fact that it 
tended to also reduce the socioeconomic isolation of minority students. See generally Gary 
Orfield & Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Why Segrega-
tion Matters: Poverty and Educational Inequality (2005), available at http://bsdweb. 
bsdvt.org/district/EquityExcellence/Research/Why_Segreg_Matters.pdf (exploring school 
and student segregation by poverty and how it relates to racial inequality); Gary Orfield, 
Must We Bus? Segregated Schools and National Policy 69 (1978). 
36 See Orfield, supra note 35, at 69. 
37 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 208–10. 
38 See id. 
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and past discrimination became less clear.39 Moreover, the problem 
existed from the outset in many northern districts where schools were 
never segregated by law.40 
 In 1975, two years after Keyes, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley held 
that, absent substantial evidence of intentional efforts to segregate stu-
dents between school districts, school desegregation remedies cannot 
extend beyond the boundaries of the primary offending school dis-
trict.41 The result of these two decisions was to leave untouched any 
segregation that could not be precisely connected to intentional dis-
crimination by schools and to protect the rapidly increasing segrega-
tion between districts that resulted as whites fled inner-city school dis-
tricts to escape desegregation.42 Nonetheless, desegregation orders 
were effective in dramatically increasing integration for two decades in 
many districts, but the withdrawal of federal mandates starting in the 
late 1980s allowed even those districts to “resegregate” to levels that re-
semble those of the late 1960s when desegregation had begun in ear-
nest.43 
 The period of federal limitations on desegregation coincided with 
the increase in state-based theories of educational equity. In fact, deseg-
regation advocates were instrumental in early school finance litigation, 
as some believed that equality of funding was as important as racial in-
tegration, if not more.44 School finance claims, however, were not pred-
icated on race. They were based on securing resources for disadvan-
taged students and districts in general, of which minority students and 
districts are only a subset.45 The point was to reform state finance struc-
tures, not local school district boundaries or school attendance zones. 
Thus, racial integration as a remedy was almost entirely irrelevant to 
school finance litigation. As racial desegregation became more unten-
able in federal court, however, desegregation advocates began to con-
sider how they might utilize and build on the success of school finance 
                                                                                                                      
39 See, e.g., Pitts, 503 U.S. at 498–99; see also James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-
Out” School Desegregation Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1513–17 (1990). 
40 See Keyes, 413 U.S. at 218–19. 
41 Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752–53. 
42 Erwin Chemerinsky, Separate and Unequal: American Public Education Today, 52 Am. U. 
L. Rev. 1461, 1469–70 (2003). 
43 Orfield & Lee, supra note 5, at 19 tbl.7. 
44 Richard F. Elmore & Milbrey Wallin McLaughlin, Reform and Retrench-
ment: The Politics of California School Finance Reform 35–36 (1982); see also Chris-
topher R. Lockard, In the Wake of Williams v. State: The Past, Present, and Future of Education 
Finance Litigation in California, 57 Hastings L.J. 385, 387 (2005) (noting the work of Der-
rick Bell, a former desegregation attorney, on early school finance litigation). 
45 Ryan, supra note 9, at 252. 
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precedent in state court.46 State-based theories could potentially free 
desegregation advocates of the problems of proving intentional dis-
crimination and securing desegregation remedies across districts.47 
 The first and most important of these attempts culminated in the 
1996 Connecticut Supreme Court case Sheff v. O’Neill.48 In Sheff, the 
plaintiffs made two distinct but interrelated arguments: first, that de 
facto segregation violated the state constitution’s guarantee of equal 
educational opportunity; and second, that the economic and racial seg-
regation in the state deprived students of an adequate education.49 The 
court held that racial segregation, whether intentional or de facto, vio-
lated students’ rights to equal educational opportunities, but it rejected 
the argument that poverty and racial isolation deprived students of an 
adequate education, finding that the plaintiffs had not properly argued 
or established the latter point in the lower courts.50 Nothing in the 
court’s opinion, however, was inconsistent with recognizing that segre-
gation deprives students of an adequate education in the future. Re-
gardless, the holding in Sheff was encouraging for those considering 
similar efforts in other states, but litigation elsewhere has ultimately 
been limited and produced mixed results. Only two other significant 
litigation efforts have proceeded, and only one has led to a published 
opinion.51 
 The next effort following Sheff was in Minnesota. In 1995, in 
NAACP v. Minnesota, the plaintiffs filed a complaint that squarely fo-
cused on the barriers to an adequate education created by concentrated 
poverty and racial segregation, forcing the issue that Sheff avoided.52 
The plaintiffs emphasized that “68 percent of Minneapolis students 
                                                                                                                      
46 Susan Eaton, The Children in Room E4: American Education on Trial 88–91 
(2007). 
47 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 513–14 (describing Sheff as overcoming the school dis-
trict boundary problem that Milliken created); Gayl Shaw Westerman, The Promise of State 
Constitutionalism: Can It Be Fulfilled in Sheff v. O’Neill?, 23 Hastings Const. L.Q. 351, 384–
86 (1996). 
48 678 A.2d 1267 (Conn. 1996). 
49 Id. at 1302 (Borden, J., dissenting). 
50 Id. at 1289 (majority opinion). 
51 Plaintiffs in one other instance intervened in a school finance case and claimed 
among other things that resegregation in Charlotte, North Carolina was impeding their abil-
ity to obtain a sound basic education, but the trial court never took any action in regard to 
the claim. Second Amended Complaint by Plaintiff-Intervenors CMS Students and Charlotte-
Mecklenburg NAACP at 3–5, Hoke Cnty. v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., No. 95 CVS 
1158 (Wake Cnty. Sup. Ct. Sept. 30, 2005), available at http://www.law.unc.edu/documents/ 
civilrights/briefs/2ndamendedcomplaint.pdf; see also Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1225; NAACP 
Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15. 
52 NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15. 
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were students of color and 66 percent were eligible for free or reduced-
price lunch, compared with a statewide population that was 14 percent 
minority and 26 percent FARM eligible.”53 Plaintiffs also cited research 
that indicated “low-income students were twice as likely to achieve at 
high levels if they attended suburban schools” to substantiate their claim 
that segregation in Minneapolis schools was inhibiting their ability to 
obtain an adequate education.54 A settlement between the parties, how-
ever, preempted the Minnesota courts from reaching the merits of the 
claim.55 
 The Minneapolis litigation was followed by similar litigation that 
made it to New York’s highest court in 2003. In Paynter v. State,56 the 
plaintiffs argued that the high-poverty concentration in Rochester City 
School District led to widespread academic failure in contrast to the 
surrounding districts, and that this failure demonstrated students were 
receiving inadequate educational opportunities.57 This time, unlike 
Sheff and NAACP, the state’s highest court issued a decision directly ad-
dressing whether the harms of concentrated poverty deprive students 
of an adequate education.58 New York’s highest court found that “alle-
gations of academic failure alone, without allegations that the State . . . 
[does not] provide minimally acceptable educational services, are in-
sufficient to state a cause of action under the Education Article [of New 
York’s Constitution].”59 The court’s opinion, however, should not be 
read in isolation because, on the same day that it rejected the claims in 
Paynter, the court upheld a school finance claim on behalf of New York 
City’s predominantly poor and minority students in Campaign for Fiscal 
Equity, Inc. v. State.60 
 The claims in Campaign for Fiscal Equity were distinct from Paynter. 
The claim of inadequate education in Campaign for Fiscal Equity was 
primarily premised on insufficient financial support from the state, 
which allowed the plaintiffs to meet the court’s required showings of 
both inadequate inputs and outputs, and the interconnection between 
                                                                                                                      
53 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 175; see NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15. 
54 Adams, supra note 9, at 1644; see NAACP Complaint, supra note 12, at 2, 9–15. 
55 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 176; Settlement Agreement Between Named Plain-
tiffs in NAACP v. Minnesota and Xiong et al. v. Minnesota and the State of Minnesota, May 16, 
2000 (on file with author). Yet, the settlement did give Minneapolis students the opportu-
nity to attend the suburban schools. Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 176. 
56 Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1227. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 1229. 
59 Id. 
60 801 N.E.2d 326, 340 (N.Y. 2003). 
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the two.61 New York’s highest court has tended to conceptualize inputs 
as tangible resources such as buildings, books, teachers, and services.62 
Finance claims fall squarely within this approach. The claim in Paynter 
was premised on the concentration of poverty created by school district 
boundaries and the inadequate education that accompanies it, not on a 
traditional input deprivation.63 Consequently, the court interpreted 
their claims as implicating demographic patterns that are disconnected 
from state policy or resources.64 Even if the plaintiffs established inade-
quate education in Rochester, they did not connect the inadequacy to a 
resource deprivation attributable to the state.65 The most favorable 
reading of the case is that the court’s rejection of the claim in Paynter 
speaks more to the precise nature and limits of the constitutional right 
to education in New York rather than a conceptual rejection of the 
plaintiffs’ claim.66 The less favorable reading is that the court was im-
plicitly rejecting the conceptual underpinnings of the claim, but simply 
used the factual distinctions from Campaign for Fiscal Equity to reach the 
desired result.67 
  The lessons to take from these three cases are not entirely clear. 
Sheff is the only case to generate positive judicial precedent. Some con-
clude that the holding is not easily transferrable to other states because 
the court’s theory was tied to an idiosyncratic constitutional clause.68 
Yet, others have minimized the importance of any idiosyncrasy in Con-
necticut’s constitution and pointed out that other states have sufficiently 
similar constitutions to justify expansion of Sheff’s theory.69 Either way, 
the two subsequent attempts to replicate Sheff failed to produce a posi-
tive precedential opinion. The settlement in Minnesota was a practical 
victory for the plaintiffs, but not a lasting principle. One could also dis-
tinguish easily enough the outcome in Paynter based on its factual and 
precedential context, but one is still left in the position of asking a court 
to recognize a claim that no other court previously has. The fact that so 
few litigants have attempted to replicate these cases’ theories or distin-
guish their outcomes is, in part, an unfortunate testament to this reality. 
                                                                                                                      
61 Id. at 332 n.3. 
62 Id. at 331–32. 
63 Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1227. 
64 Id. 
65 Id. at 1229. 
66 See id. at 1229–31. 
67 See id. 
68 See infra notes 88–91 and accompanying text. 
69 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 252. 
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B. Scholarly Theories 
 Scholars and policy advocates have been far more apt than courts 
to explore socioeconomic integration theories. On the policy side, 
Richard Kahlenberg has been the most visible proponent, arguing that 
the increases in academic achievement that coincided with racial inte-
gration were primarily a result of the socioeconomic integration that 
accompanied racial integration, and that socioeconomic integration is 
more legally defensible than racial integration.70 Thus, socioeconomic 
integration might be both educationally and legally preferable. Others 
have made similar or related arguments.71 For some, however, the al-
lure may be the potential to indirectly pursue voluntary racial desegre-
gation without being subject to equal protection strict scrutiny, with the 
key word being voluntary.72 At least in some instances, these theories 
are not about a right to racial or socioeconomic integration, but about 
defending voluntary desegregation.73 In short, the existence of poverty 
isolation does not implicate a legal wrong. 
 Another body of scholarship, in contrast, situates the problem of 
poverty concentration within the context of state constitutional rights 
to an adequate or quality education. Shortly after the decision in Sheff, 
James Ryan argued that advocates should pursue a fourth wave of 
school finance litigation.74 
[I]nstead of arguing for equalized or adequate resources, 
school “finance” plaintiffs should consider arguing for socio-
economic or racial integration, or both. Relying on the social 
                                                                                                                      
70 See, e.g., Richard D. Kahlenberg, The Century Found., Rescuing Brown v. 
Board of Education: Profiles of Twelve School Districts Pursuing Socioeconomic 
School Integration 3–5 (2007); Richard D. Kahlenberg, Socioeconomic School Integration, 
85 N.C. L. Rev. 1545, 1546–47 (2007). 
71 See, e.g., Eboni S. Nelson, The Availability and Viability of Socioeconomic Integration Post-
Parents Involved, 59 S.C. L. Rev. 841, 849 (2008); Kimberly Jenkins Robinson, The Constitu-
tional Future of Race-Neutral Efforts to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary 
and Secondary Schools, 50 B.C. L. Rev. 277, 283–84 (2009); Jacob E. Meusch, Note, Equal 
Education Opportunity and the Pursuit of “Just Schools”: The Des Moines Independent Community 
School District Rethinks Diversity and the Meaning of “Minority Student,” 95 Iowa L. Rev. 1341, 
1365 (2010). 
72 See, e.g., Robert A. Garda, Jr., The White Interest in School Integration, 63 Fla. L. Rev. 
599, 645–49 (2011); Nelson, supra note 71, at 843–44. 
73 See, e.g., Robinson, supra note 71, at 283 (“[G]overnments should be given wide lati-
tude to adopt race-neutral efforts to avoid racial isolation and create diverse schools 
. . . .”); Kristi L. Bowman, A New Strategy for Pursuing Racial and Ethnic Equality in Public 
Schools, 1 Duke F. for L. & Soc. Change 47, 66–68 (2009) (discussing the possibility of 
using socio-economic status to continue voluntary desegregation efforts). 
74 Ryan, supra note 9, at 307–10. 
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science evidence that demonstrates the short- and long-term 
benefits of socioeconomic and racial integration, plaintiffs 
should be able to formulate an argument that racial and socio-
economic integration are necessary components of a student’s 
constitutional right to an equal or adequate education.75 
Ryan further emphasized that this move might be necessary if students 
are to actually receive equal and adequate educational opportunities 
because additional resources alone in high-poverty, racially isolated dis-
tricts are likely to be insufficient.76 Five years later, Molly McUsic, re-
flecting on the fiftieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education,77 
staked out a similar theory, arguing that school finance should serve as 
a continuation of Brown’s legacy.78 Like Ryan, she indicated that socio-
economic integration or the alleviation of concentrated poverty is nec-
essary and, thus, a part of the affirmative right to education under state 
constitutions.79 Since then other scholars have seconded Ryan and 
McUsic’s point and, in some instances, delved deeper into the details 
and implications of such a claim.80 As indicated above, however, this 
scholarly fervor has not yet been vindicated. 
C. The Legal and Practical Distinctions of Intra-District Poverty Segregation 
 Although relevant, the previous theories and attempts to use state 
constitutional law to address segregation are conceptually distinct from 
this Article’s theory. In particular, the litigation efforts and scholarship 
are largely, if not exclusively, premised on securing inter-district deseg-
regation,81 whereas this Article proceeds on the narrower basis of intra-
district poverty desegregation. Because more segregation exists be-
                                                                                                                      
75 Id. at 308. 
76 Id. 
77 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
78 McUsic, supra note 9, at 1335. 
79 Id. 
80 Liu, supra note 11, at 101–06 (calling for a synthesis of school finance litigation and 
desegregation); Orfield, supra note 24, at 330–33; Adams, supra note 9, at 1639–42; Angela 
Ciolfi, Note, Shuffling the Deck: Redistricting to Promote a Quality Education in Virginia, 89 Va. 
L. Rev. 773, 799–822 (2003); Julie Zwibelman, Note, Broadening the Scope of School Finance 
and Resource Comparability Litigation, 36 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 527, 529–30 (2001) (argu-
ing that school finance litigation should broaden its scope and including desegregation as 
a point of focus); see also Aaron Jay Saiger, School Choice and States’ Duty to Support “Public” 
Schools, 48 B.C. L. Rev. 909, 969 (2007) (arguing that state educational clauses include the 
right of parents to choose to send their children to public schools other than those in their 
neighborhood). 
81 See, e.g., Gooch, supra note 16, at 396–98; Orfield, supra note 24, at 273–76; Saiger, 
supra note 15, at 516–27. 
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tween school districts than within them,82 inter-district desegregation is 
both a preferable and necessary component to addressing the needs of 
many students attending high-poverty schools. But inter-district deseg-
regation carries with it any number of practical and legal challenges 
that are minimized or nonexistent with intra-district claims.83 
 On the practical side, intra-district desegregation, by definition, 
entails a smaller and more compact geographic area. Thus, a district 
has a far less tenable basis for arguing that desegregation is infeasible 
or impracticable.84 In addition, school district boundaries, although 
arbitrary on some level, are often long-standing, and the demographic 
populations of the districts are largely a result of demographic shifts 
that occurred independently and long after districting.85 Neither the 
boundaries, nor the demographics shifts within them, are necessarily 
related to any recent state education policy.86 Thus, as a matter of per-
ception, district lines bear the imprimatur of tradition and neutrality. 
 In contrast, student assignment policies and boundaries within 
districts are constantly in flux.87 As a result, a legal remedy that affects 
intra-district policies would seem far less radical or disruptive than an 
inter-district remedy. Likewise, because intra-district boundaries are 
subject to perpetual change and debate, the active role the school sys-
tem plays in deciding where students attend school is far more obvious, 
whereas the demographic differences between school districts can ap-
pear to be a function of private choices rather than current public pol-
icy. This is not to suggest that the state lacks responsibility for its deci-
sions to maintain historical school district boundaries, but only that the 
perception of state and local policy is different. 
 This Article’s theory is, likewise, doctrinally distinct from others. 
First, neither the positive decision in Sheff, nor the negative one in 
Paynter, is directly applicable to this Article’s theory of intra-district 
poverty segregation. Sheff is not controlling nor clearly analogous in so 
                                                                                                                      
82 Reardon & Yun, supra note 28, at 1573–74. 
83 The history of racial desegregation has plainly demonstrated a reluctance on the 
part of the courts to order interdistrict desegregation. See, e.g., Milliken, 418 U.S. at 752–53 
(limiting desegregation to school district boundaries). 
84 For instance, the Court in Milliken v. Bradley focused on the complexity of school fi-
nances and local responsibility issues that would arise if students were crossing boundaries, 
as well as transportation burdens. Id. at 741–43. 
85 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 499–501. 
86 See id. But see Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438–40 (D. Del. 1975) (finding 
that the state had recently reorganized its school districts in a way that increased segrega-
tion). 
87 See Saiger, supra note 15, at 536–38. 
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far as the claim there is tied to a unique constitutional clause.88 Its con-
stitution provides, “No person shall be denied the equal protection of 
the law nor be subjected to segregation or discrimination . . . because of . . . 
race [or] . . . ancestry . . . ,”89 which the court interpreted to prohibit 
both intentional and unintentional school segregation.90 This rationale 
is potentially applicable to at least two other state constitutions, but may 
not be to others.91 
 Second, constitutional idiosyncrasies aside, the focus on intra-
district segregation simply implicates a different legal analysis and struc-
ture. Foremost, this Article does not conceptualize the constitutional 
problem as segregation per se, but as inequitable resource distribution. 
Where a district is predominantly poor, a constitutional violation would 
not arise from the fact that all of its schools are predominantly poor. In 
effect, the district would only be constitutionally charged with fairly util-
izing the resources it has, and middle-income students are not one of 
them. But in districts that have a significant percentage of middle-
income students, the system has an existing resource that it chooses how 
to allocate each year. These districts would be constitutionally responsi-
ble for equitably allocating these resources, which means avoiding the 
overconcentration of poor or middle-income students in particular 
schools. Thus, this Article does not tackle the problem of demographic 
shifts within states, between districts, or even the increase in poverty lev-
els in a district as a whole. It takes poverty or wealth at the district level 
as a given and potentially beyond the district’s control. But this Article’s 
theory draws a constitutional distinction in regard to those middle-
income and poor students enrolled in a district because these students 
                                                                                                                      
88 John C. Brittain, Why Sheff v. O’Neill Is a Landmark Decision, 30 Conn. L. Rev. 211, 
217–18 (1997); Rachel F. Moran, Milo’s Miracle, 29 Conn. L. Rev. 1079, 1096 (1997); Alicia 
L. Mioli, Note, Sheff v. O’Neill: The Consequence of Educational Table-Scraps for Poor Urban 
Minority Schools, 27 Fordham Urb. L.J. 1903, 1909 (2000) (“Integrationists have hailed 
Sheff as a landmark decision because of its unique qualities. . . . Sheff is the only school seg-
regation case in force today that is based on state law, rather than federal law. Second, Sheff 
mandated an interdistrict remedy that is now nearly impossible in federal desegregation 
cases.”). 
89 Conn. Const. art. I, § 20 (amended 1974, 1984) (emphasis added). 
90 Sheff, 678 A.2d at 1282–83. 
91 New Jersey and Hawaii’s constitutions also contain segregation prohibitions. Haw. 
Const. art. I, § 9 (amended 1978) (guaranteeing that no citizen shall be “segregated [in 
the military] because of race, religious principles, or ancestry”); N.J. Const. art. I, ¶ 5 
(“No person shall be denied the enjoyment of any civil or military right, nor be discrimi-
nated against in the exercise of any civil or military right, nor be segregated in the militia 
or in the public schools, because of religious principles, race, color, ancestry or national 
origin.”); see also Bernard K. Freamon, The Origins of the Anti-Segregation Clause in the New 
Jersey Constitution, 35 Rutgers L.J. 1267, 1311–24 (2004). 
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are within the district’s control. Their existence or nonexistence cannot 
be blamed on the state or third parties. Recognizing that they are a cru-
cial resource in the delivery of adequate or equal educational opportu-
nities, the district would be constitutionally bound to refrain from poli-
cies that offer these resources to one group of students but not others.92 
 Of course, this rational could extend upward to a state’s districting 
policies, but the clarity of the inequity and the concept of resource dis-
tribution are less obvious when one moves beyond the district. The 
point of challenging intra-district poverty segregation is to show that it 
is not inevitable and, thus, it is universally problematic. Moreover, chal-
lenging this segregation does not require a grand theory of a state’s 
responsibility or even poverty concentration as a per se violation of 
constitutional norms. It only requires acknowledging that districts must 
treat students within their borders equally in regard to constitutional or 
affirmative rights—a concept so basic and accepted that, after the 
Court announced Brown v. Board of Education, it has often warranted no 
judicial analysis at all. 
II. A Constitutional Right to Equal Access to  
Middle-Income Peers 
 A constitutional right to equal access to middle-income peers fol-
lows from three relatively simple and largely uncontested principles in 
school finance law. First, students have a right to educational opportu-
nities that lead to positive outcomes.93 Funding, albeit important, is 
relevant only because of its indirect effects on this right. Second, local 
school districts’ responsibility for delivering educational opportunities 
is not obviated or diminished by a state’s ultimate responsibility for 
funding, monitoring, or structuring education.94 Third, like a state’s 
responsibility to equitably or adequately fund and support education at 
the district level, districts have a responsibility to equitably or ade-
quately distribute the resources they receive from the state.95 Within 
this framework, one need only recognize that middle-income peers are 
one of a district’s resources to establish a constitutional right to equita-
ble access to middle-income peers. 
                                                                                                                      
92 See infra notes 96–173 and accompanying text. 
93 See infra notes 96–127 and accompanying text. 
94 See infra notes 100–127 and accompanying text. 
95 See infra notes 128–173 and accompanying text. 
390 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:373 
A. The Right to Equitable and Quality Educational Opportunities,  
Not Just Money 
 The remedy sought in state constitutional education litigation has 
almost uniformly been additional funding for local school districts.96 
But additional funding is not an end in and of itself. Funding is rele-
vant only because it can purchase the critical inputs, such as teachers 
and curricula, which are necessary to offer students an equal educa-
tional opportunity or some qualitative level of education.97 The ulti-
mate issue is whether students are receiving the appropriate constitu-
tional education,98 which can be jeopardized through any number of 
state and local school policies, only one of which is financing.99 For in-
stance, the state can just as easily deprive students of a quality education 
by adopting an out-dated curriculum that focuses on the skills needed 
for an agrarian society as it can by inadequately funding a modern cur-
riculum. Thus, the constitutional right to an education places not only 
financial obligations on the state, but various other duties that are nec-
essary to ensure students receive equal educational opportunities or a 
quality education. 
B. Educational Responsibility Extends to the Local Level 
 Although most states bear the ultimate responsibility for educa-
tional failures,100 local school districts are also responsible for support-
ing and delivering a constitutional education. States delegate extensive 
responsibilities to school districts, including financial, staffing, and im-
plementation decisions.101 States are responsible for setting up an edu-
cational structure and monitoring local activities, but the daily and 
practical aspects of delivering a constitutional education rest within the 
purview and discretion of school districts.102 The misguided exercise of 
                                                                                                                      
96 See Note, Unfulfilled Promises: School Finance Remedies and State Courts, 104 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1072, 1074–75 (1991). 
97 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 308 (arguing that the right to an adequate or equal educa-
tion encompasses far more than just money); James E. Ryan, Essay, Sheff, Segregation, and 
School Finance Litigation, 74 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 529, 532 (1999). 
98 See, e.g., Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State, 655 N.E.2d 661, 666 (N.Y. 1995); 
Hoke Cnty. v. State, 599 S.E.2d 365, 373 (N.C. 2004). 
99 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 253–54. 
100 See Michael A. Rebell, Poverty, “Meaningful” Educational Opportunity, and the Necessary 
Role of the Courts, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1467, 1527 (2007) (noting plaintiff victories against the 
state in over half of the states). 
101 See Aaron Jay Saiger, The Last Wave: The Rise of the Contingent School District, 84 N.C. L. 
Rev. 857, 864–67 (2006) (discussing the extensive delegation of duties to school districts). 
102 See id. 
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school district discretion can just as easily lead to inadequate education 
as state funding shortfalls and misguided state policy. 
 School finance litigation, at the broadest level, has been a battle 
between states and school districts over educational responsibilities.103 
Traditionally, education was treated as almost solely the responsibility of 
local districts, and it was against this backdrop that most school finance 
litigation was brought.104 School districts and students have attempted 
to shift this paradigm, uniformly arguing that, although the practical 
responsibility for delivering education rests with the district, the consti-
tutional and ultimate responsibility for education rests with the state.105 
States have responded by either rejecting the argument outright or as-
serting that the state has the authority to delegate extensive responsibil-
ity to districts.106 In effect, even if the state is constitutionally responsi-
ble, it has discretion in how it discharges this responsibility, including 
promoting local control of education.107 Regardless, the relevant point 
is that the litigation has been unilateral, focusing almost exclusively on 
the extent to which state constitutions place limits and obligations on 
the state. Courts have devoted only passing attention to any residual or 
inherent school district responsibility, either assuming that districts are 
carrying out their responsibilities appropriately or ignoring the issue 
altogether.108 
 This unilateral focus, however, is a result of practical, not legal, re-
alities. School finance litigation has primarily been brought by institu-
tional stakeholders, rather than students or states.109 The reasons are 
relatively obvious. School districts and teachers have more access to the 
                                                                                                                      
103 See Molly McUsic, The Use of Education Clauses in School Finance Reform Litigation, 28 
Harv. J. on Legis. 307, 328 (1991). 
104 Richard Briffault, The Role of Local Control in School Finance Reform, 24 Conn. L. Rev. 
773, 781 (1992); see McUsic, supra note 103, at 332; see also, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. 
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 49–50 (1973). 
105 See Gregory C. Malhoit & Derek W. Black, The Power of Small Schools: Achieving Equal 
Educational Opportunity Through Academic Success and Democratic Citizenship, 82 Neb. L. Rev. 
50, 52 (2003). 
106 See, e.g., Idaho Schs. for Equal Educ. Opportunity v. State, 976 P.2d 913, 914–15 
(Idaho 1998) (attempting to assert a third-party complaint against local school officials for 
failing to properly allocate funds). 
107 See Hancock v. Comm’r of Educ., 822 N.E.2d 1134, 1152 (Mass. 2005) (Marshall, 
C.J., concurring) (“[T]he education clause leaves the details of education policymaking to 
the Governor and the Legislature.”); Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 390–91 (finding that al-
though the state was constitutionally responsible, it still retained discretion as to how to 
rectify violations and structure education). 
108 See infra note 129 and accompanying text. 
109 See James E. Ryan, The Influence of Race in School Finance Reform, 98 Mich. L. Rev. 
432, 451–55 (1999) (noting the number of districts suing states in various cases). 
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necessary resources to initiate litigation than students, and their suits 
are naturally going to be against the state. Students theoretically have 
reason to sue both school districts and states, but student plaintiffs have 
come from under-resourced districts and have tended to perceive that 
the primary need is more resources from their state.110 In effect, their 
claims are on behalf of their districts. Finally, the states have no motiva-
tion to sue anyone (other than the federal government), as they have 
the legislative capacity to produce any educational arrangement they 
see fit within their jurisdictions.111 Given these practical realities, the 
absence of explicit judicial focus on the constitutional duties of districts 
is not evidence that the duties do not exist. 
 More importantly, constitutional duties necessarily reside with 
school districts, regardless of the courts’ holdings in regard to states. 
First, where the state has primary or ultimate constitutional responsibil-
ity for education, it still carries out that responsibility through districts 
and delegates certain responsibilities to them. Court holdings placing 
the ultimate responsibility on states recognize that states have some re-
sponsibility and cannot simply shift all responsibility onto districts,112 
but they generally refrain from endorsing the broader principle that 
districts have no responsibility at all.113 Second, even if districts have no 
independent constitutional responsibility, districts exercise delegated 
state responsibility.114 In this respect, the distinction between state and 
                                                                                                                      
110 See Robert H. Tiller, Litigating Educational Adequacy in North Carolina: A Personal Ac-
count of Leandro v. State, 488 S.E.2d 255 (N.C. 1997), 83 Neb. L. Rev. 893, 899 (2005) (dis-
cussing school finance litigation by individual students against the state and the fact that 
the court did not limit the evidence to the plaintiffs, but rather allowed evidence regard-
ing the entire district). 
111 Once drawn into the litigation, states do, however, have the motivation to assert 
counterclaims against local districts. See, e.g., Idaho Schs., 976 P.2d at 922 (rejecting State’s 
attempt to file third party complaint against district superintendants). 
112See Opinion of the Justices (Reformed Public School Financing System), 765 A.2d 
673, 676 (N.H. 2000) (“The State may not shift any of this constitutional responsibility to 
local communities.”); see also Rebell, supra note 100, at 1485–86. 
113 See, e.g., Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 388–90; Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter 
(McWherter II ), 894 S.W.2d 734, 738–39 (Tenn. 1995) (recognizing that the state could im-
pose some responsibility on districts); see also Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, U.S. Dep’t 
of Educ., An Historical Overview of Revenues and Expenditures for Public Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education, by State: Fiscal Years 1990–2002, at 65–66 tbl.3.e 
(2007), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2007/2007317.pdf (presenting data that reveals 
districts in almost every state retain responsibility for a significant portion of educational 
funding). 
114 See Tex. Const. art. VII, § 3 (granting the legislature power to delegate taxing au-
thority to school districts); Campbell Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. State, 907 P.2d 1238, 1272 (Wyo. 
1995) (indicating that the state has the power to delegate authority to districts so long as 
the constitutional mandates of education are met). 
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local responsibility is one of form, not function. Regardless of who is 
primarily responsible, an obligation to provide education operates at 
both the state and district levels. If a state has a responsibility to raise 
funds for schools and deliver them to school districts, school districts 
are responsible for expending those funds toward the benefit of public 
education. A school district’s failure to do so might implicate the state, 
but it would implicate the district as well. 
 Third, with the exception of separation of powers concerns, those 
school finance claims against the state that have been rejected have 
been premised on the constitutionality of educational systems where 
localism dominates,115 not the notion that no educational responsibility 
exists at all. Courts have held that the state has discharged its constitu-
tional duty by creating, funding, and extending discretion to local dis-
tricts.116 The courts sanction this method of carrying out the state’s 
constitutional duty even though it produces significant variances 
among districts,117 but this rational does not extend a blank check to 
the districts. Unless one assumes that transferring constitutional duties 
to local districts grants districts authority without any corresponding 
responsibility or that the transfer extinguishes the rights that would 
otherwise flow from the constitutional duty, students presumably have 
educational rights that can be asserted against districts. 
 Absent such assumptions, the primary question would not be 
whether local districts incur constitutional responsibility, but rather 
what limits constrain districts in the exercise of delegated constitutional 
authority. Of course, those limits proscribed by state statute would con-
trol, as districts cannot exercise authority that is not granted to them.118 
But absent relevant statutory limits, a district would presumably have 
some discretion, just as the state would have had discretion if it had re-
tained primary control over education.119 This discretion, however, is 
                                                                                                                      
 
115 See, e.g., Comm. for Educ. Rights v. Edgar, 672 N.E.2d 1178, 1196 (Ill. 1996); Scott v. 
Commonwealth, 443 S.E.2d 138, 142 (Va. 1994). 
116 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1178. 
117 See, e.g., Olsen v. State, 554 P.2d 139, 148 (Or. 1976) (finding that a finance system did 
not violate the equal protection or education clauses of the Oregon Constitution because the 
it sets a minimal standard, whereby the state is in compliance “if the state requires and pro-
vides for a minimum of educational opportunities . . . and permits the districts to exercise 
local control over what they desire, and can furnish, over the minimum”); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 
142–43. 
118 See, e.g., Campbell Cnty., 907 P.2d at 1272 (“It must also be accepted, however, that 
the framers did not prohibit a local role but left the nature and scope of that local role to 
the discretion of the legislature.”). 
119 See, e.g., Neeley v. West Orange-Cove Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 176 S.W.3d 746, 776, 
778 (Tex. 2005) (acknowledging that article VII, section 1 of the Texas Constitution 
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not open-ended. Textually inherent limits would still exist on both the 
state’s and local districts’ exercise of discretion. For instance, even the 
most lenient of educational clauses impose a duty on the state to de-
liver education.120 Thus, like the state, a local district exercising dele-
gated power would be constitutionally bound to build and maintain 
schools and offer relevant instruction within them. 
 Fourth, other constitutional clauses would operate to constrain lo-
cal districts in ways that they would not constrain the state. For instance, 
courts have held that equal protection imposes few limits on legislatures 
in states where the relevant education clause grants the legislature ex-
tensive freedom to delegate authority or promote localism.121 The dis-
cretion embodied in the education clause supersedes state equal protec-
tion limits. The same reasoning, however, would not logically extend to 
districts. Because districts lack explicit or primary constitutional author-
ity in regard to education,122 there is no independent authority that 
would supersede the limits equal protection would otherwise place on 
inequalities. Even where a state delegates power or extends discretion to 
districts, this delegation would not include the authority to treat schools 
or students arbitrarily or unequally within districts.123 States made anal-
ogous attempts during racial desegregation and the U.S. Supreme Court 
                                                                                                                      
“commits to the Legislature, the most democratic branch of the government, the authority 
to determine the broad range of policy issues in providing for public education,” but reit-
erating that “[t]his duty is not committed unconditionally to the legislature’s discretion, 
but instead is accompanied by standards”). 
120 See, e.g., Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1190 (recognizing that the constitution imposes an 
educational duty on the state, but finding that it is not for the courts to define the qualita-
tive contours of that duty); Scott, 443 S.E.2d at 142 (rejecting plaintiffs’ claim against the 
state, but acknowledging that the Virginia “Constitution does mandate that the General 
Assembly provide for a system of free public schools throughout the Commonwealth, and 
the General Assembly has provided for such a system”). 
121 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1193–96; McDaniel v. Thomas, 285 S.E.2d 156, 168 (Ga. 
1981). 
122 See, e.g., Campbell Cnty., 907 P.2d at 1272 (indicating that the constitution does not 
create a local role in education, but rather leaves that question to the legislature). Colo-
rado is an exception to this general rule. Its constitution vests explicit independent educa-
tional authority in local districts. E.g., Colo. Const. art. IX, § 15. Other constitutions also 
require districts to raise funds, although this is not the equivalent of educational authority 
that supersedes that of the state. E.g., Wis. Const. art. X, § 4. 
123 See, e.g., McDuffy v. Sec’y of the Exec. Office of Educ., 615 N.E.2d 516, 548 (Mass. 
1993) (“While it is clearly within the power of the Commonwealth to delegate some of the 
implementation of the duty to local governments, such power does not include a right to 
abdicate the obligation imposed on magistrates [the executive branch] and Legislatures 
placed on them by the Constitution.”). 
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struck them down as clearly unconstitutional.124 In short, although a 
state can delegate its powers to districts, it cannot authorize them to vio-
late the state or federal constitution.125 Because districts lack primary 
constitutional responsibility over education, they also lack the full dis-
cretion that responsibility affords and the equal protection leniency it 
might afford in some states. 
 Finally, although not expansive or particularly substantive, some 
constitutions place explicit constitutional responsibility on school dis-
tricts. For instance, some state constitutions set minimum and/or max-
imum tax rates that local districts may impose for education.126 District 
discretion in these states is clearly constrained within these bench-
marks. Similarly, in implementing their constitutional duties, almost all 
state legislatures have enacted complex statutory frameworks that obli-
gate school districts in various educational aspects, from textbook and 
curriculum selection to educational quality, teacher hiring, and district 
management.127 In short, in addition to the forgoing implicit responsi-
bilities, local districts also have explicit educational responsibilities that 
rest solely with them. 
C. The Resource Distribution Principle 
 The manner in which state and local school districts allocate their 
resources is as important as the amount of resources they have.128 States 
and school districts with abundant funds and resources can still fail to 
                                                                                                                      
124 See Griffin v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of Prince Edward Cnty., 377 U.S. 218, 225 (1964) (strik-
ing down the state’s delegated authority to districts to close public schools and fund pri-
vate tuition instead). 
125 The Supreme Court has enforced the same principle at the federal level, holding 
that Congress lacks the power to authorize states or localities to violate the U.S. Constitu-
tion. See, e.g., South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 210–11 (1987) (holding that Congress 
cannot induce states to violate the Constitution); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 
(1969) (“Congress may not authorize the States to violate the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
126 See Ark. Const. art. XIV, § 3, amended by Ark. Const. amend. 74 (setting a base mill 
rate of twenty-five for school districts); Me. Const. art. VIII, pt. 1, § 1 (mandating local dis-
tricts make provisions for schools); see also Bd. of Educ. of City Sch. Dist. of Cincinnati v. Wal-
ter, 390 N.E.2d 813, 825 (Ohio 1979) (noting that the State had, pursuant to the constitu-
tion, imposed a funding floor at 20 mills); McLennan v. Aldredge, 159 S.E.2d 682, 685–86 
(Ga. 1968) (discussing 1945 amendments to the constitution that set minimum and maxi-
mum mill rates). 
127 See, e.g., N.C. Gen. Stat. § 115C (2009); Va. Code Ann. § 22.1-253.13:1 (West 2006); 
see also Martha I. Morgan et al., Establishing Education Program Inadequacy: The Alabama Exam-
ple, 28 U. Mich. J.L. Reform 559, 568–71 (1995) (discussing Alabama’s legislative and admin-
istrative structure for education). 
128 See, e.g., Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 388–89 (discussing the State’s and local districts’ 
responsibility to strategically allocate resources). 
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provide equal or adequate opportunities if those funds are spent on the 
wrong services or distributed to the wrong places.129 Likewise, a district 
might have just enough resources but still fail to deliver a constitutional 
education because it does not make the best strategic choices of how to 
use those resources. In effect, the state may have done its part to make 
a constitutional education possible, but the district can take action that 
inhibits the delivery of the appropriate education. Even though the 
state might have the ultimate responsibility to correct such a district, 
the constitutional failure occurs at the district level and the solution is 
not more funding for the district, but better allocation of existing re-
sources. Of course, it is also possible that failures occur at both the state 
and district levels. The state might provide inadequate funds and a dis-
trict might make matters worse by poorly allocating those resources. In 
short, constitutional rights to education require that educational sys-
tems adhere to effective distributional mechanisms and principles.130 
 This distributional requirement at the state level is relatively obvi-
ous in school finance litigation. For instance, equity litigation is inher-
ently premised on the notion that the state must structure its finance 
system in a way that affords all school districts equal access to re-
sources.131 To the extent that inequitable distribution affects educa-
tional opportunity, it is facially problematic in states where education is 
a fundamental right or students have a right to equal educational op-
portunity.132 When courts uphold equity claims, the state is forced to 
allocate larger sums of money to poor school districts and less to oth-
ers133 or, in the case of Texas, to recapture funds from wealthy districts 
and give them to poorer districts.134 
 Strategic distribution of resources is not necessarily required in 
adequacy claims because states are theoretically free to waste all the 
money they see fit and permit vast inequality, so long as no one’s educa-
tion falls below the qualitative benchmark.135 But as a practical matter, 
                                                                                                                      
129 See Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 377–82 (N.J. 1990) (discussing the variance in 
how efficiently districts use their funds and the problem it creates in determining whether 
money matters); William E. Thro, Judicial Analysis During the Third Wave of School Finance 
Litigation: The Massachusetts Decision as a Model, 35 B.C. L. Rev. 597, 615 (1994). 
130 See infra notes 131–173 and accompanying text. 
131 See Julie K. Underwood, School Finance Adequacy as Vertical Equity, 28 U. Mich. J.L. 
Reform 493, 497–98 (1995). 
132 See id. at 504–13 (discussing the scrutiny applied to inequities when education is a 
fundamental or protected right). 
133 See, e.g., Serrano v. Priest, 226 Cal. Rptr. 584, 601 (Ct. App. 1986). 
134 Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Meno, 893 S.W.2d 450, 486 (Tex. 1995). 
135 See William S. Koski & Rob Reich, When “Adequate” Isn’t: The Retreat from Equity in 
Educational Law and Policy and Why It Matters, 56 Emory L.J. 545, 562–63 (2006). 
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states under adequacy mandates must also adhere to strategic distribu-
tion. Although many students may need very little additional support to 
obtain an adequate education, others have special needs or face barri-
ers that require the educational system to respond with supplemental 
monetary, curricular, or service supports.136 Because states lack the lav-
ish resources to both waste resources on some students and fund the 
special needs of others, states are forced to redistribute larger per-pupil 
expenditures or supplemental funds to poorer districts and districts 
with large proportions of at-risk students.137 The failure to do so would 
present not only a problem of adequacy, but equity, as the system is ef-
fectively providing one set of students an adequate education while de-
nying it to others.138 
 Although less obvious, the constitutional dimensions of distribu-
tional decisions are no less applicable at the school district level. Where 
courts have enforced a distributional principle against the state, there is 
no reason why the state would be permitted to accomplish indirectly 
through districts what it cannot accomplish directly itself.139 Likewise, 
even were the state not implicated by local actions, a school district 
should not be free to create inequalities that the state could not. To 
permit as much would make the quality and quantity of the state’s allo-
cation irrelevant and completely contingent on district whims. This 
would invert the constitutional structure and make districts superior to 
the state. 
 The same rationale might also apply in states where courts have 
rejected equity claims against the state.140 Courts in those states may 
                                                                                                                      
136 Rebell, supra note 100, at 1480. 
137 See Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (Fiscal Equity III ), 801 N.E.2d 326, 348–
49 (N.Y. 2003); DeRolph v. State, 728 N.E.2d 993, 1014–15 (Ohio 2000). 
138 See Derek Black, Unlocking the Power of State Constitutions with Equal Protection: The First 
Step Toward Education as a Federally Protected Right, 51 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1343, 1406 
(2010) (arguing that federal equal protection is implicated when states are providing one 
set of students an adequate education but are denying it to others); see also Koski & Reich, 
supra note 135, at 562–65. 
139 The U.S. Supreme Court has made this point clear in regard to the relationship be-
tween Congress and the states, holding that Congress is prohibited from using its spending 
power to encourage others to engage in unconstitutional actions. See, e.g., Dole, 483 U.S. at 
210–11 (holding that Congress cannot induce states to violate the Constitution). The 
Court has, likewise, recognized exceptions to the state actor doctrine and prohibited dis-
crimination by private actors when their activity was intertwined with government or repli-
cated government functions. See Burton v. Wilmington Parking Auth., 365 U.S. 715, 724–
25 (1961). 
140 See Martin R. West. & Paul E. Peterson, The Adequacy Lawsuit: A Critical Appraisal, in 
School Money Trials: The Legal Pursuit of Educational Adequacy 1, 4–7 (Martin 
R. West & Paul E. Peterson eds., 2007) (listing the states where equity claims have failed). 
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relieve the state of equitable resource distribution, but it does not fol-
low that they also relieve local districts. The state’s legitimate end of 
fostering local control, which is the justification for allowing inequali-
ties,141 is far different from a single school district treating schools and 
students within it unequally. First, autonomy and inequality at the 
school level is not necessary for local control. Sufficient local control 
would presumably exist as a result of the state delegating educational 
power to the districts. States have never argued, nor have any other par-
ties suggested, that local control necessitates school level control. Sec-
ond, a delegation of authority to districts contemplates variance be-
tween districts, not schools. Thus, inequalities that are a consequence 
of delegation to districts fall squarely within a constitutional scheme, 
whereas school level inequalities would not. 
 These local distributional and allocation decisions are so central to 
state education rights that some courts have explicitly emphasized 
school districts’ distributional responsibility. North Carolina offers a 
leading example. In 1999, in Leandro v. State, the North Carolina Su-
preme Court held that students have a right to a sound basic educa-
tion,142 and defined the right as including qualitative knowledge in vari-
ous academic subjects sufficient to prepare students to participate and 
compete in society and work.143 The court then remanded the case for a 
determination of whether students were receiving this education.144 In a 
second opinion, the court evaluated whether students were receiving a 
sound basic education by focusing on three distinct aspects of the edu-
cation system: outputs, inputs, and delivery mechanisms. Outputs in-
cluded, but were not limited to, standardized test scores, graduation 
rates, college attainment, and remediation needs.145 Inputs included 
teachers, curricular programs, and funding.146 Delivery mechanisms 
referred to how the state and school districts allocate and dispense the 
resources they have.147 In effect, the court evaluated whether the educa-
tional system is effectively using its resources to provide students with a 
sound basic education.148 
                                                                                                                      
141 See, e.g., Kukor v. Grover, 436 N.W.2d 568, 585 (Wis. 1989) (holding that disparities 
in funding of local school districts do not violate the right to a public education because 
the principle of local control that produces the disparities is constitutionally based). 
142 488 S.E.2d 249, 254 (N.C. 1997). 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 261. 
145 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 381. 
146 Id. at 389. 
147 Id. at 388–89. 
148 Id. 
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 The court ultimately found that the state was providing insufficient 
resources for students to receive a sound basic education, but the court 
also agreed with the trial court “‘that neither the State nor . . . [the 
Hoke County School System] are strategically allocating the available 
resources to see that at-risk children have the equal opportunity to ob-
tain a sound basic education.’”149 Consequently, the court directed 
both the state and school districts to “conduct self-examinations of the 
present allocation of resources and to produce a rational . . ., compre-
hensive plan which strategically focuses available resources and funds 
towards meeting the needs of all children, including at-risk children[,] 
to obtain a sound basic education.”150 This directive potentially impli-
cates every local and state policy bearing upon the quality of education, 
whether it is the more obvious funding priorities of a district or the 
more subtle decisions regarding the way in which a district assigns its 
teachers to schools or determines which students will have access to 
schools that provide particular resources and opportunities. 
 Other courts have been less prescriptive than North Carolina, but 
similarly emphasize the importance of local distributional and alloca-
tion decisions. For instance, the Tennessee Supreme Court upheld the 
plaintiffs’ school finance claim against the state, but acknowledged that 
significant responsibility still fell on the districts.151 The court indicated 
that the state could impose “funding and management responsibilities 
upon counties, municipalities, and school districts, within their respec-
tive constitutional powers” and, in such cases, those districts would be 
prohibited from mismanagement, indifference, or incompetence that 
undermined “the constitutional mandate of substantial equality of op-
portunity.”152 
 Another category of states implicitly includes the duty to strategi-
cally utilize resources within the very definition of the right to educa-
tion. Although the distributional and allocation points are not as clearly 
stated as in North Carolina, these states define the right to education in 
such a way that it would border on implausible to exclude distributional 
and allocation principles from the right.153 In particular, some educa-
                                                                                                                      
149 Id. at 388 (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court). 
150 Id. at 389 (alteration in original) (quoting the trial court). 
151 Tenn. Small Sch. Sys. v. McWherter (McWherter I ), 851 S.W.2d 139, 140–41 (Tenn. 
1993). 
152 Id. at 141. 
153 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text. 
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tion clauses mandate an “efficient” education.154 In total, twenty-two 
states fall into this category.155 The dictionary definition of “efficient” 
offers straightforward meanings, which include “performing or func-
tioning in the best possible manner with the least waste of time and ef-
fort” and “satisfactory and economical to use.”156 Courts have inter-
preted their constitutional language consistent with such definitions.157 
 Two of the leading cases on point come from West Virginia and 
Kentucky. In 1979, in Pauley v. Kelly, the West Virginia Supreme Court 
found that the constitutional phrase “efficient” commanded that “the 
education system be absolutely complete, attentive to every detail, ex-
tending beyond ordinary parameters. . . . [I]t must produce results 
without waste.”158 In addition, the court indicated the constitutional 
language required that a quality education be delivered “economi-
cally.”159 Although the lawsuit was against the state, the court’s reason-
ing also encompassed local school districts’ actions.160 The court noted 
that many other courts “have required specific actions by local boards 
to bring them to compliance with the constitutional mandate” and that 
state action that failed to ensure local compliance had likewise “been 
declared unconstitutional.”161 In setting the standard for West Virginia, 
the court concluded that, in addition to quality instruction and facili-
ties, the constitutional mandate requires “careful state and local super-
vision to prevent waste and to monitor pupil, teacher and administra-
tive competency.”162 In short, the court’s definition of efficiency 
includes not just the duty to fund and support schools, but to ensure 
they run well and to maximize the impact of the resources they have, 
which, of course, would entail strategic allocation and distribution at 
the state and local levels. 
 The Kentucky Supreme Court, in 1989, defined its constitutional 
mandate of efficiency similarly in Rose v. Council for Better Education.163 
The Court ultimately held and broadly stated: 
                                                                                                                      
154 See Ky. Const. § 183 (“The General Assembly shall, by appropriate legislation, pro-
vide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.”). 
155 See William E. Thro, Commentary, The Role of Language of the State Education Clauses 
in School Finance Litigation, 79 Educ. L. Rep. 19, 23–24 (1993). 
156 Efficient Definition, Dictionary.com, http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/effi 
cient (last visited Jan. 10, 2012). 
157 See infra notes 158–173 and accompanying text. 
158 255 S.E.2d 859, 874 (W. Va. 1979). 
159 Id. at 877. 
160 Id. at 874. 
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 877. 
163 790 S.W.2d 186, 210 (Ky. 1989). 
2012] Middle-Income Peers and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access 401 
The General Assembly must not only establish the [qualita-
tively adequate educational] system, but it must monitor it on 
a continuing basis so that it will always be maintained in a 
constitutional manner. The General Assembly must carefully 
supervise it, so that there is no waste, no duplication, no mis-
management, at any level.164 
The prohibition on waste and duplication necessarily demands strate-
gic resource allocation, and the extension of this prohibition to all lev-
els of education necessarily includes school districts.165 
 It is important to note that, although the foregoing cases and the 
basic language of efficiency might dictate local distributional responsi-
bilities, the precise wording of a state’s education clause has not always 
been determinative of its substantive meaning.166 In adequacy cases in 
particular, courts, notwithstanding the fact they were addressing various 
different constitutional phrases, have reached essentially the same con-
clusion regarding the substantive effect of their educational clauses.167 
These courts have concluded that the constitution’s intent is to offer a 
quality education that prepares students for later educational, civic, and 
employment opportunities and duties,168 regardless of whether the un-
derlying constitutional language guarantees a thorough, minimal, ade-
quate, uniform, or efficient education.169 Yet, the willingness of courts 
                                                                                                                      
164 Id. at 211. 
165 In reaching this conclusion, the court considered “foreign cases, along with our 
constitutional debates, Kentucky precedents and the opinion of experts.” Id. at 210. It 
seemed to rely heavily on two expert witnesses. Id. One expert opined that an efficient 
education is “a three part concept. First, the system should impose no financial hardship 
or advantage on any group of citizens. Further, local school districts must make compara-
ble tax efforts. Second, resources provided by the system must be adequate and uniform 
throughout the state. Third, the system must not waste resources.” Id. The other expert 
also opined that an efficient system of schools is one that is “properly managed.” Id. at 211. 
166 William E. Thro, Note, To Render Them Safe: The Analysis of State Constitutional Provi-
sions in Public School Finance Reform Litigation, 75 Va. L. Rev. 1639, 1659–60 (1989). 
167 Compare Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212 (holding that the constitutional mandate to “pro-
vide an efficient system of common schools throughout the state” guarantees students an 
adequate education), with Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 254 (holding that the constitutional lan-
guage of “a right to the privilege of education” and “the duty of the State to guard and 
maintain that right” guarantees students a sound basic education), and Fiscal Equity III, 801 
N.E.2d at 328 (holding that the constitutional mandate to “provide for the maintenance 
and support of a system of free common schools, wherein all the children of this state may 
be educated” guarantees students a sound basic education). 
168 See supra notes 112–127 and accompanying text. 
169 See Paul L. Tractenberg, Education, in 3 State Constitutions for the Twenty-
First Century: The Agenda of State Constitutional Reform 241, 293 n.137 (G. Alan 
Tarr & Robert F. Williams eds., 2006) (“[D]isembodied parsing of constitutional terminol-
ogy may be of limited or no value.”). 
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to underplay the exact language in their constitution has generally co-
incided with expanding rather than limiting education rights. It is, 
thus, far less clear that a court would disregard a constitutional direc-
tive that benefits students. 
 More importantly, the mandate of efficient education is, in key 
respects, less ambiguous than other educational mandates. As to sub-
stantive and qualitative meanings of constitutional phrases, all constitu-
tional iterations of education stand in relatively the same position be-
cause the quality and content that is necessary to prepare students for 
work, citizenship, and daily life is a moving targe contingent on con-
text. Thus, in regard to substantive qualitative guarantees, “efficient” 
may be no more definite than high quality, adequate, or thorough.170 
But as to administrative and structural components—what one might 
call procedural or non-substantive aspects of education— efficient has a 
definiteness that is missing in other phraseologies. In fact, the phrase-
ologies often ignore this side of education altogether. As the dictionary 
definitions above suggest, the core consensus meanings of efficient 
speak to these procedural aspects. Moreover, this distinction helps syn-
thesize the judicial opinions in those states interpreting their mandates 
of efficiency. Those states that have refused to follow West Virginia and 
Kentucky’s lead appear to have done so not because efficiency is am-
biguous in regard to procedural aspects of education, but because it is 
ambiguous as to substance.171 Once one narrows the definitional in-
quiry of educational efficiency, its mandate of strategic resource utiliza-
tion would seem largely beyond dispute. 
 In sum, states and local districts have a constitutional duty to dis-
tribute resources so as to eliminate inequities and inadequacies in edu-
cational opportunity. This concept is logically inherent in equity claims, 
as their central premise is an illegitimate allocation of resources 
amongst districts. In adequacy claims, the concept is a practical neces-
sity because available educational resources are limited and must be 
focused in a way that prevents the most disadvantaged schools and stu-
dents from falling below qualitative thresholds. And regardless of 
whether plaintiffs have proceeded under equity or adequacy claims, the 
concept is embedded in the very language of constitutions that man-
                                                                                                                      
170 Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85 (arguing that the term efficient is not unambiguous 
and defining it differently than other jurisdictions); Hornbeck v. Somerset Cnty. Bd. of 
Educ., 458 A.2d 758, 770 (Md. 1983) (indicating that the word efficient is susceptible to 
more than one meaning). But see Rose, 790 S.W.2d at 212. 
171 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 770. 
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date an “efficient” education.172 Both court opinions and straightfor-
ward dictionary definitions indicate as much.173 
D. The Final Link 
 The foregoing principles would potentially implicate a host of ed-
ucational policies beyond financing.174 For the purposes of this Article, 
the most important application is in regard to local student assignment 
policies, particularly those that result in racially unequal access to mid-
dle-income peers. But as noted earlier, the recognition of a constitu-
tional right to equal access to middle-income peers requires one addi-
tional conceptual step that, although alluded to by one court, no court 
has yet made.175 That step is to establish the connection between an 
adequate or equal educational opportunity and racially equitable access 
to middle-income peers. This connection can be conceptualized 
through four interrelated, yet distinct, factual predicates. First, assign-
ing high proportions of poor students to particular schools creates re-
source and other barriers that impede the ability of students in those 
schools to obtain a quality education and deny them equal opportunity. 
Second, middle-income students or environments are themselves re-
sources or inputs, just like money, which are essential to obtaining qual-
ity educational opportunities. Thus, under an equity or adequacy the-
ory, the state must consciously and fairly manage these crucial 
resources. Third, the cost of delivering adequate or equal educational 
opportunities in schools with concentrated poverty far exceeds the cost 
of delivering adequate or equal opportunities in middle-income 
schools. In times of economic crisis, local school districts and states are 
highly unlikely to have sufficient resources to fund constitutionally 
adequate opportunities in high-poverty schools. And in times of both 
prosperity and crisis, high-poverty schooling is economically inefficient. 
 Finally, although courts have yet to make any of the three concep-
tual connections between constitutional educational opportunities and 
the distribution of middle-income peers, several courts have paid spe-
cific attention to the prevailing circumstances of poor academic achieve-
ment in districts with high concentrations of poor and at-risk students, 
treating those circumstances as prima facie evidence of inadequate edu-
                                                                                                                      
172 See Edgar, 672 N.E.2d at 1184–85; Hornbeck, 458 A.2d at 770. 
173 It also bears noting that some of these inequalities might be equally prohibited un-
der federal law, depending on their causes. See Black, supra note 138, at 1350–51. 
174 See Ryan, supra note 9, at 296–307. 
175 See supra notes 22–27 and accompanying text. 
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cation and recognizing the existence of constitutional violations in these 
districts.176 A search for the root cause of these violations would inevita-
bly lead to the foregoing conceptualizations of access to middle-income 
peers. The following Sections discuss each of these points in full. 
1. Harms of Racial and Poverty Isolation 
 The educational harms that minority students suffer as a result of 
attending school in racial isolation are well documented. African-
American students’ achievement on the National Assessment of Educa-
tional Progress lags twenty-seven scaled points behind whites in reading 
and thirty-one points in math.177 This achievement gap is equivalent to 
two to three years of learning.178 Thus, African-American eighth grad-
ers are earning scores equivalent to sixth-grade white students. Re-
search indicates that much of this achievement gap is not based on race 
itself, but is largely attributable to the fact that predominantly minority 
schools are also overwhelmingly high-poverty schools,179 and high-
poverty schools depress the academic achievement of students who at-
tend those schools.180 It is not just that a student’s individual demo-
graphic characteristics make him or her less likely to succeed; rather, 
high-poverty schools have a negative impact on a student’s educational 
outcomes regardless of the student’s individual socioeconomic status.181 
 In at least six major academic categories, predominantly poor and 
minority schools cause harm or deliver inferior educational opportuni-
ties to students. First, students in predominantly poor and minority 
                                                                                                                      
176 See infra notes 238–255 and accompanying text. 
177 The Condition of Education, supra note 8, App. A, at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-13-
2. 
178 Christopher Lubienski & Sarah Theule Lubienski, Nat’l Ctr. for the Study of 
Privatization in Educ., Charter, Private, Public Schools and Academic Achieve-
ment: New Evidence from NAEP Mathematics Data 5 (2006), available at http://www. 
ncspe.org/publications_files/OP111.pdf (explaining how to interpret achievement gaps on 
the NAEP); The Condition of Education, supra note 8, App. A, at 153 tbl.A-12-2, 157 tbl.A-
13-2. 
179 See Anurima Bhargava et al., NAACP Legal Def. & Educ. Fund, Inc. & The Civ-
il Rights Project, Still Looking to the Future: Voluntary K–12 School Integra-
tion 14 (2008); Derek W. Black, In Defense of Voluntary Desegregation: All Things Are Not 
Equal, 44 Wake Forest L. Rev. 107, 117–18 (2009); Ryan, supra note 9, at 272–75. 
180 See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 21–22; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 47; So-
cioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 1–4; McUsic, supra 
note 9, at 1355–56. 
181 See Coleman et al., supra note 25, at 302–10; Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 62; 
Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 1–4; Borman & 
Dowling, supra note 26, at 1201–02; McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56; Perry & McConney, 
supra note 26, at 1137–38. 
2012] Middle-Income Peers and the Constitutional Right to Equal Access 405 
schools tend to receive a generally low-quality curriculum and have un-
equal access to high-level curricular offerings.182 Second, even though 
research shows teacher quality is closely linked to student achieve-
ment,183 students in predominantly poor and minority schools tend to 
have limited access to highly qualified teachers.184 As a general matter, 
these schools find it extremely difficult to attract high-quality teachers. 
Even when they do secure quality teachers, predominantly poor and 
minority schools find it difficult to retain them.185 The best teachers 
often leave high-poverty, high-minority schools as soon as they obtain 
sufficient experience.186 Predominantly poor and minority schools are 
then forced to replace the departing teachers with inexperienced and 
less qualified teachers.187 Consequently, predominantly poor and mi-
nority schools suffer from exceptionally high teacher turnover.188 The 
                                                                                                                      
 
182 See Ruth B. Ekstrom et al., Education and American Youth 57–60 (1988); 
Jeannie Oakes et al., Curriculum Differentiation: Opportunities, Outcomes, and Meanings, in 
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183 See generally Linda Darling-Hammond, Teacher Quality and Student Achievement: A Re-
view of State Policy Evidence, 8 Educ. Pol’y Analysis Archives, no. 1, 2000 at 1, available at 
http://epaa.asu.edu/ojs/article/viewFile/392/515 (finding teacher quality to be strongly 
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cational Progress). 
184 See Stephen Carroll et al., Rand Corp., The Distribution of Teachers Among 
California’s School Districts and Schools, at xx–xxii (2000); Susanna Loeb & Mi-
chelle Reininger, The Educ. Policy Ctr. at Mich. State Univ., Public Policy and 
Teacher Labor Markets: What We Know and Why It Matters, at i–iv (2004); Daniel P. 
Mayer et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Monitoring School Quality: An Indicators Report 
10–14 (2000), available at http://nces.ed.gov/pubs2001/2001030.pdf; Charles T. Clotfelter et 
al., Who Teaches Whom? Race and the Distribution of Novice Teachers, 24 Econ. Educ. Rev. 377, 
391 (2005); Catherine E. Freeman et al., Racial Segregation in Georgia Public Schools, 1994–2001, 
in School Resegregation: Must The South Turn Back? 148, 157–59 ( John Charles Rog-
er & Gary Orfield eds., 2005); Christopher Jencks & Meredith Phillips, The Black-White Test 
Score Gap: Why It Persists and What Can Be Done, Brookings Rev., Spring 1998, at 24, 26 
(1998), available at http://www.brookings.edu/articles/1998/spring_education_jencks.aspx 
(“Predominantly white schools seem to attract more skilled teachers than black schools.”); 
Steven G. Rivkin et al., Teachers, Schools, and Academic Achievement, 73 Econometrica 417, 450 
(2005); Jay Mathews, Top Teachers Rare in Poor Schools, Wash. Post, Sept. 10, 2002, at A5 (dis-
cussing the dearth of high quality teachers in low income schools). 
185 See Eric A. Hanushek et al., Why Public Schools Lose Teachers, 39 J. Hum. Resources 
326, 337 (2004). 
186 See id.; see also Barnett Berry & Eric Hirsch, Ctr. for Teaching Quality, Re-
cruiting and Retaining Teachers for Hard-to-Staff Schools 2 (2005) (identifying 
recruiting and retention problems in high-poverty, low-performing schools); Susan 
Moore Johnson et al., Harvard Grad. Sch. of Educ., Who Stays in Teaching and 
Why: A Review of the Literature on Teacher Retention 9–10 (2005). 
187 See Hanushek, supra note 185, at 347–52. 
188 See Erica Frankenberg, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Segrega-
tion of American Teachers 25–31 (2006), available at http://campaignforethnicstudies. 
pbworks.com/f/segregation_american_teachers12-06.pdf (revealing that teacher dissatisfac-
406 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 53:373 
lack of continuity in their teaching staff itself, likewise, negatively im-
pacts schools.189 
 Money alone cannot easily fix the problem of teacher staffing at 
predominantly poor and minority schools because the problem is not 
simply one of money.190 Rather, the racial and socioeconomic charac-
teristics of schools significantly influence where teachers decide to 
teach.191 Those teachers with options---who tend to be high-quality 
teachers---generally will not voluntarily choose to teach in high-
minority, high-poverty schools.192 Of course, money is not entirely ir-
relevant, but absent huge salary increases, teachers will still prefer 
schools with fewer numbers of poor and minority students.193 And, in 
any event, very few predominantly poor and minority school systems 
have the resources to offer such huge salary increases. In fact, it is not 
unusual for predominantly poor and minority school districts to have 
less money to attract teachers than surrounding school districts.194 In 
short, predominantly poor and minority schools are seriously disadvan-
                                                                                                                      
tion tends to rise as the percentage of minority students in a school rises, making it more 
likely that teachers will leave); Educ. Trust, Their Fair Share, How Texas-Sized Gaps 
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190 See Jane L. David, Teacher Recruitment Incentives, Educ. Leadership, Apr. 2008, at 84, 
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191 See Susanna Loeb et al., How Teaching Conditions Predict Teacher Turnover in California 
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for each increase of ten percent in minority student enrollment to induce white females to 
teach in the school). 
193 See Alliance for Excellent Educ., supra note 192, at 7; Hanushek, supra note 
185, at 350–51. 
194 See, e.g., Educ. Trust-West, California’s Hidden Teacher Spending Gap: How 
State and District Budgeting Practices Shortchange Poor and Minority Stu-
dents and Their Schools 1 (2005), available at http://www.edtrust.org/west/publication 
/californias-hidden-teacher-spending-gap-how-state-and-district-budgeting-practices-0. 
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taged in securing one of the most important resources: highly qualified 
teachers.195 
 Third, unequal access to teachers and curriculum has the natural 
result of negatively impacting student achievement. Students in pre-
dominantly poor and minority schools routinely achieve much lower 
than students in predominantly white schools.196 For instance, a study 
of Charlotte-Mecklenburg schools in North Carolina showed that, even 
controlling for factors such as a student’s family background, prior 
achievement, peer effects, and self-reported academic effort, students 
who spent more time in predominantly minority elementary schools 
had lower standardized test scores and grade point averages in middle 
and high school.197 Likewise, Wake County, North Carolina’s study of 
its own schools revealed similar achievement failures in those schools 
with the highest levels of poor students,198 which also strongly corre-
lates with race in Wake County. These examples are the norm. As one 
judge noted, more than eighty percent of the lowest performing school 
districts in North Carolina are predominantly minority.199 
 Fourth, the depressed achievement of students in predominantly 
poor and minority schools has compounding long-term effects as well. 
The graduation rates in these schools are alarmingly low. On average, 
only four out of ten students graduate on time in the nation’s predomi-
nantly poor and minority high schools.200 For instance, in 2004–2005 in 
Baltimore City Schools, a high-poverty and high-minority school system, 
only one-third of the students graduated on time.201 Moreover, lower 
graduation rates hold true regardless of a student’s individual race or 
wealth.202 These low graduation rates are partly attributable to students 
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in predominantly poor and minority schools having lower success on 
graduation exams,203 but many students in these schools drop out be-
fore they even take the graduation exam. Simply attending a predomi-
nantly poor and minority school makes a student significantly more like-
ly to drop out of high school.204 
 Fifth, attending a predominantly poor and minority school tends to 
limit students’ access to later opportunities in higher education and 
employment. Students from predominantly minority schools are less 
likely to matriculate to college and four-year universities.205 Likewise, 
those who do not pursue higher education also have less access to social 
networks that are crucial to securing jobs.206 As a general matter, racially 
integrated middle-income schools have the inverse effect of predomi-
nantly poor and minority schools on graduation and matriculation 
rates.207 In sum, high-poverty, predominantly minority schools expose 
students of all races and socioeconomic classes to serious educational 
harms that make it far more likely than not that they will receive a con-
stitutionally deficient education. Where these high-poverty schools re-
sult from student assignment policies within the district, rather than the 
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Graduation, Class of 2001, at 31–34 (2004). 
203 Chungmei Lee, The Civil Rights Project at Harvard Univ., Racial Segrega-
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tional Outcomes, 80 N.C. L. Rev. 923, 953 (2002) (“Attending racially diverse schools opens 
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overall poverty of the district itself, the constitutional allocation princi-
ples discussed in the previous Section are directly implicated.208 
2. Middle-Income Students as a Resource 
 Although high-poverty schools can undermine students’ educa-
tion, predominantly middle-income schools bring affirmative benefits 
to the learning environment. The crucial ingredient in the success of 
middle-income schools is the students who attend them. Middle-
income students themselves are thus an educational resource. The 
quality of a student’s educational experience can be as dependent on 
his peers as it is on his teachers, the quality of his school building, or 
the substance of his curriculum. First, students depend heavily upon 
one another for their learning.209 They study together, teach one an-
other, and compete against one another, raising the academic bar.210 
Due to the opportunities they receive outside of school, middle- and 
high-income students tend to bring more educational capital to school 
and, thus, elevate the learning of those around them.211 Second, mid-
dle-income students come from families that tend to have higher aca-
demic expectations for their children.212 When these students are the 
majority in a school, the students create a culture of high achievement 
that benefits everyone.213 Third, middle-income students’ parents tend 
to place high expectations on school officials and hold them account-
able.214 As a result, these schools are more effective than others.215 
Fourth, as the previous Section suggests, those resources that are im-
portant to learning—high-quality teachers, leadership, curriculum, fi-
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nancing, and facilities—all tend to exist when the majority of a school’s 
students are middle income.216 
 In sum, although not a resource in the traditional sense of an in-
put that a school can buy, the intangible benefits that middle-income 
students bring to the learning environment make them a vital resource. 
In fact, as the experience of socioeconomically isolated schools demon-
strates, middle-income students are a resource that schools cannot eas-
ily afford to go without. The data and social science on this point is 
relatively clear.217 Middle-income parents instinctively recognize this 
and jockey to enroll their children in solidly middle-income schools or, 
at least, middle-income classes if they cannot secure a middle class 
school.218 Thus, the conceptual hurdle is not recognizing the impor-
tance of middle-income peers, but recognizing that they are an educa-
tional resource, just as are teachers, facilities, and books. The primary 
difference is that school systems cannot generate middle income-
students, but they nonetheless make decisions through their student 
assignment policies regarding those middle-income students they do 
have. Once student assignments are understood as resource allocations, 
they should be subject to the same distributional, management, and 
equity principles that state constitutions require for money and other 
resources. 
3. The Expense and Inefficiency of Racial and Socioeconomic Isolation 
 Delivering education in schools with concentrated poverty is eco-
nomically inefficient. It is, of course, possible for poor and minority 
students to obtain a quality education in high-poverty schools. In fact, a 
small but high-profile contingent of predominantly poor and minority 
                                                                                                                      
216 See James E. Ryan, Five Miles Away, A World Apart: One City, Two Schools, 
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schools defy the odds and achieve at high levels.219 But delivering a 
quality education to students under these circumstances can cost far 
more per pupil than it otherwise would.220 First, because poor students 
are already at-risk of academic failure and that risk is further increased 
by attending a high-poverty school, these schools need the best, not the 
worst teachers.221 Yet as discussed earlier, teachers are predisposed 
against teaching in these schools and, thus, it costs significantly more to 
lure high-quality teachers to high-minority, high-poverty schools.222 Se-
cond, for various practical reasons, high-poverty schools cost more to 
keep safe than other schools.223 Third, the need for intensive instruc-
tional and social service programs tends to be significantly higher in 
high-poverty schools.224 
 Federal legislation and studies explicitly recognize this reality. The 
federal government estimates that the cost of educating low-income 
students is approximately forty percent more than middle-income stu-
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dents,225 and that the per-pupil costs rise exponentially as both the per-
centage and overall number of poor students in a district increases.226 
Federal funding for low-income students, however, only offsets a por-
tion of these additional costs. The fact that so many state supreme 
courts have found that their education finance systems are providing 
inequitable or inadequate funds to students in such districts is persua-
sive evidence that states are either unwilling or unable to devote the 
resources necessary to offset the negative effects of the segregated edu-
cation.227 Moreover, the remedies in several of these cases have recog-
nized the higher costs in high-poverty districts and driven additional 
resources to these districts.228 Of course, socioeconomically integrated 
schools must also provide supplemental services for at-risk children, but 
they do not bear the other, sometimes exponentially, higher costs that 
are associated with high-poverty schools.229 
 The higher cost of educating students in concentrated poverty 
presents both constitutional and practical problems. As a practical mat-
ter, the unfortunate truth is that districts and states rarely have the re-
sources or the will to fund quality education in high-poverty school dis-
tricts.230 The prospects are even worse during times of economic crisis. 
Currently, schools across the board are experiencing dwindling local 
revenues and huge cuts in their state funding231 While some jurisdic-
tions may have the capacity to raise taxes or absorb the losses without 
affecting educational quality, property-poor districts’ capacity to gener-
ate revenue tends to be maxed out even during times of prosperity, 
                                                                                                                      
225 Education Finance Incentive Grant Program § 1125(A), 20 U.S.C. § 6337 (2006) 
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and, thus, they have no excess to draw upon or cut during a crisis.232 In 
fact, one study suggests that there has never been a systemic funding of 
the full costs of educating students in high-poverty schools.233 Eco-
nomic hardship may inevitably force them to diminish the quality of 
their educational offerings below already insufficient levels.234 In short, 
the practical reality has been a choice between just two options: provid-
ing poor and minority students an adequate education within an inte-
grated environment, or offering them an inadequate education else-
where. Unfortunately, the frequent choice is a segregated education 
devoid of the resources necessary for full adequacy, yet still more ex-
pensive than integrated education. 
 The economic cost of educating students in high-poverty schools 
when other options are available raises constitutional concerns as well. 
Most obviously, courts in leading cases like Rose and Pauley specifically 
prohibit waste and inefficiency,235 which are directly implicated by 
shouldering higher education costs just to maintain poverty or wealth 
concentrations. The same rationale would tend to follow in states with 
rigorous concepts of equity, as the state could be required to justify 
funding variances between districts. Of course, many state constitutions 
do not entail a rigorous concept of efficiency or equity.236 Thus, if all 
schools were delivering adequate or equal educational opportunities, 
the cost or waste associated with doing so might be excusable. In effect, 
the ends might justify the means. Yet, circumstances where school sys-
tems are so flush with resources that they can deliver adequate or equal 
outcomes amidst rampant waste and inefficiency are hard to imagine 
on any consistent basis. For instance, geographic and transportation 
circumstances might make the cost of deconcentrating poverty higher 
than simply shouldering the full cost of delivering a constitutional edu-
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cation in concentrated poverty,237 but this would be an exception to the 
rule, which a district presumably must establish, rather than the gen-
eral rule itself. In sum, when students attend schools in concentrated 
poverty out of administrative convenience, historical practice, or other 
less defensible reasons, the financial waste involved runs counter to an 
efficient use of educational resources and makes delivering a quality 
and constitutional education highly unlikely. 
4. High-Poverty Schooling and Failure as Prima Facie Evidence 
 Although no court has yet taken the conceptual step suggested 
above, courts have routinely paid particular attention to high-poverty 
school districts and treated the circumstances that tend to arise in them 
as prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation.238 These courts 
have not recognized the constitutional dimensions of the distributional 
decisions that lead to high-poverty schools (as they may assume these 
school conditions are natural or inevitable),239 but these courts have 
been quick to recognize the negative educational outcomes in high-
poverty schools as representing a constitutional violation. Thus, a rela-
tively fine line separates courts’ evidentiary focus from the conceptual 
step articulated above. Courts need only distinguish high-poverty 
schooling that is inevitable from high-poverty schooling that is created. 
Then the courts’ focus can move behind the seemingly obvious uncon-
stitutional outcomes to the unconstitutional distributional decisions 
that are less obvious, but lead to the outcomes. 
 One of the key prevailing facts in high-poverty school districts that 
has drawn courts’ attention is their dropout rate. Several courts have 
treated an extremely high dropout rate as prima facie evidence of in-
adequate or inequitable educational opportunities.240 As one state su-
preme court wrote: 
                                                                                                                      
237 For instance, the geographic distance between some communities and schools can 
make the transportation costs and commuting time high enough that integrative assign-
ment policies are inefficient. 
238 See infra notes 239–255 and accompanying text. 
239 See Martha R. Mahoney, What’s Left of Solidarity? Reflections on Law, Race, and Labor His-
tory, 57 Buff. L. Rev. 1515, 1586–87 (2009); Parker, supra note 1, at 1177; powell & Menen-
dian, supra note 27, at 1095. 
240 See Montoy v. State, 112 P.3d 923, 934 (Kan. 2005); see also Hancock, 822 N.E.2d at 
1168 (Greaney, J., dissenting) (stating that the lower court “examined a number of objec-
tive criteria used by the department [of education] as indicators of education program 
quality”); Neeley, 176 S.W.3d at 767–69, 787, 789; Fiscal Equity I, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 520 (“In 
sum, City public school students’ graduation/dropout rates and performance on standard-
ized tests demonstrate that they are not receiving a minimally adequate education.”). 
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[A]n inordinate number of [the district’s] students have con-
sistently failed to match the academic performance of their 
statewide public school counterparts and . . . such failure, 
measured by their performance while attending [the dis-
trict’s] schools, their dropout rates, their graduation rates 
[and] their need for remedial help . . . constitute[s] a clear 
showing that they have failed to obtain a [constitutionally] 
comporting education.241 
In short, a high dropout rate represents “‘a systematic weakness . . . in 
meeting the needs of . . . students.’”242 As indicated earlier, this system-
atic weakness is most obvious in high-poverty schools. They tend to 
have alarmingly high dropout rates that exceed those of any other 
schools.243 Student assignment policies that operate to starve these 
schools of the most important resources of high-quality teachers and 
middle-income students make widespread failure almost certain. In 
short, high-poverty, high-minority schools almost always include this key 
indicia of inadequate or inequitable education. 
 The second area of judicial focus that corresponds with the recog-
nition of middle-income peers as a constitutionally relevant resource is 
the concentration of at-risk and poor students. Courts have not treated 
concentrated poverty as a factor within the state’s control, but they have 
treated the existence of concentrated poor kids as tending to raise con-
stitutional concern. North Carolina’s Supreme Court, for instance, in-
cluded within its five major findings and conclusions that “there were 
an inordinate number of ‘at-risk’ students attending [the district in 
question]”244—a category of students defined elsewhere as including 
poor and minority students.245 The court then reiterated the inordinate 
number of at-risk students and academic failures in the district several 
times, indicating that the concentration of failure and at-risk students is 
exactly what demands the attention of the state and school districts to 
ensure students have the opportunity to receive a sound basic educa-
tion.246 A New York court was even more poignant, writing that, “A de-
fining characteristic of the New York City public school system is its 
                                                                                                                      
241 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 386. 
242 Id. at 384. 
243 See Bhargava, supra note 179, at 21; see also N.C. Dep’t of Pub. Instruction, 2006 
4-Year Cohort Graduation Rate by School (2007), http://www.ncpublicschools.org/ 
docs/newsroom/news/2006-07/byschool-attach4.pdf. 
244 Hoke Cnty., 599 S.E.2d at 392. 
245 Id. at 389 n.16. 
246 See id. at 392. 
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high concentration of students from poor and low income families. . . . 
The intersection of factors such as students’ poverty, immigration sta-
tus, and limited English language proficiency means that New York City 
has a high proportion of students ‘at risk’ for academic failure.”247 The 
New Jersey Supreme Court took recognition of the importance of con-
centrated poverty to the next level, specifically tying certain services to 
the level of concentrated poverty in districts.248 Other courts have, like-
wise, recognized the need for particularized remedies in such dis-
tricts.249 
 Interestingly, while New York and North Carolina’s courts were 
attuned to concentrated poverty, both refused to entertain the intersec-
tion of concentrated poverty and failure as giving rise to a distinct 
claim. In North Carolina, the court did not per se reject the claim “that 
due to the particular demographics of . . . urban districts, which in-
clude many disadvantaged children, . . . [these districts are] entitled to 
an unequally large per-pupil allocation of state school funds,”250 but the 
court concluded that the claim did not warrant independent treatment 
because it was “repetitious of [the] previous argument that the state 
must provide all of its children with the opportunity to receive a sound 
basic education.”251 In effect, if the concentration of at-risk students in 
urban districts gave rise to additional needs, the state would already be 
obligated to meet them and no specialized claim is necessary to reach 
this conclusion. Thus, the predicate inquiry is the same in every dis-
                                                                                                                      
247 Fiscal Equity I, 719 N.Y.S.2d at 490. The dissenting judge in the lower court properly 
forecast the appellate court’s opinion, writing “children from impoverished families may 
experience further hurdles if they attend a school filled with similarly disadvantaged chil-
dren, schools with ‘concentrated poverty.’” Campaign for Fiscal Equity, Inc. v. State (Fiscal 
Equity II ), 744 N.Y.S.2d 130, 153 (App. Div. 2002) (Saxe, J., dissenting). 
248 Abbott, 710 A.2d at 462–63 (explicitly tying pre-kindergarten and other services to 
concentrated poverty levels). 
249 See Montoy v. State, 138 P.3d 755, 758 (Kan. 2006) (“We noted that the evidence at 
trial demonstrated the opposite—that the districts with high-poverty, high at-risk student 
populations are the ones that need help attracting and retaining teachers.”); Lake View 
Sch. Dist. No. 25 of Phillips Cnty. v. Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d 1, 4 (Ark. 2004). An adequacy 
study indicated one requirement was 
[a]dditional staff members for schools with high concentrations of poverty, to 
include tutors and “pupil support personnel” added to school faculty for each 
100 students qualifying for federal free and reduced-price lunches, with a 
minimum of one at each school; in addition, each 100 children identified as 
“English Language Learners” (ELL) generate an additional 0.40 full-time 
equivalent (FTE) tutor/teacher. 
Huckabee, 189 S.W.3d at 4. 
250 Leandro, 488 S.E.2d at 257. 
251 Id. 
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trict: are students receiving a sound basic education? New York’s high-
est court implicitly reached the same conclusion by rejecting a constitu-
tional claim arising out of Rochester’s high-poverty district on the same 
day it recognized a claim of inadequate education in New York City’s 
high-poverty schools.252 The difference between the two cases was that 
the plaintiffs in New York City simply alleged an inadequate education, 
which would presumably require more funding, while the plaintiffs in 
Rochester claimed that concentrated poverty itself was a violation.253 
 The astute attention to the problem of high-poverty schooling, yet 
fine parsing as to whether it gives rise to an independent claim, sug-
gests that courts generally recognize a problem, but may not under-
stand its cause or constitutional relevance. If concentrated poverty 
merely coexisted with inadequate education without causing it or con-
centrated poverty was unavoidable in all instances, the approaches of 
New York and North Carolina’s courts would be defensible. Yet neither 
of these is invariably true. First, as social science reveals, academic bar-
riers do not randomly occur in high-poverty districts; rather, the fact 
that a school is high-poverty is a primary reason why high-quality teach-
ers pursue opportunities elsewhere.254 Likewise, the barriers a student 
encounters due to his own poverty will follow him to any school he at-
tends, but the expectations and rigor placed on his classroom and 
school as a whole are a result of the poverty level of his school.255 Sec-
ond, as this Article’s empirical study below reveals, not all concentrated 
poverty is inevitable. Rather, much concentrated poverty is the result of 
policies within districts themselves. If these two crucial facts can be im-
pressed upon courts, the distinction between the high-poverty districts 
representing the conditions of unconstitutional education and high-
poverty districts as a cause of unconstitutional education should dimin-
ish and open the way to constitutionalizing equal access to middle-
income peers. 
III. Empirical Evidence of Widespread Violations 
 School districts and states make resource distribution decisions 
when they develop student assignment policies. In a district where all 
schools are middle income, the decision to maintain some schools at 
eighty percent middle income and others at sixty-five or seventy percent 
                                                                                                                      
252 See Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1228–29; Fiscal Equity III, 801 N.E.2d at 330–31. 
253 See Paynter, 797 N.E.2d at 1228–29; Fiscal Equity III, 801 N.E.2d at 330–31. 
254 See supra notes 184–195 and accompanying text. 
255 See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text. 
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is unlikely to present a constitutional problem; nor, in an overwhelm-
ingly poor district is it likely that a constitutional problem arises from 
assigning slightly larger percentages of middle-income students to a par-
ticular school when all of the schools remain predominantly poor.256 
But when a school district concentrates poor students in particular 
schools when other options are available, it necessarily makes decisions 
that will create barriers to learning, starves the schools with concen-
trated poverty of vital resources, and depresses academic achievement 
therein. Similarly, when an educational system over-concentrates mid-
dle-income students in particular schools, it necessarily allocates one of 
its most valuable resources away from some students and toward other 
students. As the following Sections demonstrate, decisions of these sorts 
consistently occur along racial lines, undermining the ability of minority 
students to receive a sound basic education.257 Yet from the outset, this 
Article acknowledges that it paints with a relatively broad brush in deal-
ing with complex questions of student assignment and achievement, 
and that nuanced and definitive conclusions require study by individuals 
with statistical expertise far beyond that of the author of this Article. 
Nonetheless, the results of this Article’s study reveal trends of inequity 
that implicate district level student assignment policies and beg explana-
tions. 
A. Inquiries and Methodology 
1. Equality of Access 
 This Article’s empirical study examines two issues: first, the extent 
to which school districts are providing minority students unequal access 
to middle- income peers; and second, the extent to which this inequal-
ity corresponds with larger achievement gaps. In resolving these issues, 
the study does not attempt to identify an optimum percentage of mid-
dle-income students in a school. Rather, it accepts the social science 
consensus that the socioeconomic demographics of a school matter.258 
By doing so, the study can ask the narrower questions of what school 
districts do with the middle-income students in their districts and 
whether those decisions correspond with any changes in achievement 
                                                                                                                      
256 Of course, if these distributional choices were based on race, they would violate 
equal protection. Keyes v. Sch. Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 209–10 (1973). Thus, this Article’s 
primary purpose is to address racially unequal access that may not be or cannot be shown 
to be intentional discrimination. 
257 See Socioeconomic Composition of the Public Schools, supra note 26, at 9. 
258 See supra notes 177–208 and accompanying text. 
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gaps. In this respect, this inquiry is distinct from most other studies, as 
it accepts rather than questions the level of poverty that exists within a 
district. This study seeks only to resolve whether the access to the mid-
dle-income students that exists within a district is equal. 
 For instance, consider a district where only thirty percent of the 
students are middle income. The district can assign students in such a 
way that white students are more likely than minority students to attend 
school with these middle-income students. White students might still be 
in predominantly poor schools, but the average white student might be 
in a school with forty or forty-five percent middle-income students 
while the average minority student is in a school with only twenty-five 
percent middle-income students. This study’s methodology, in most 
instances, would not qualitatively distinguish between this disparity and 
one that results in a district where all students of all races attend pre-
dominantly middle-income schools, but whites attend schools with 
higher percentages of middle-income students. Rather, the primary 
distinction this study’s methodology would reveal between these dis-
tricts would be if one district was creating a higher or lower racial dis-
parity in access to existing middle-income peers. In this respect, the 
study remains neutral as to districts’ demographic populations, and fo-
cuses squarely on racially equal access. If access to middle-income peers 
is a key educational resource, then district actions that distribute these 
resources in a racially unequal manner are the key concern, and just as 
problematic as funding or staffing a minority school at lower levels than 
a white school down the road in the same district. 
 The first step in this Article’s methodology for assessing “equality 
of access” to middle-income peers is to identify the percentage of mid-
dle-income students in every school in a given state, which it calculates 
as the percentage of students in a school that do not qualify for free or 
reduced lunch. Second, the study identifies the percentage of white, 
African-American, and Latino students in each school. Third, the study 
uses school level data to calculate district level average access to middle-
income students for Latino, African-American, and white students.259 
Next, the study compares the average access of each of these racial 
groups and translates it into a percentage.260 For instance, if the aver-
age white student attends a school where fifty percent of his peers are 
                                                                                                                      
259 The formula for a racial group’s average access to middle-income peers is: [(num-
ber of students in racial group in school A x percentage of middle-income peers in school 
A) + (same formula for every school)] / (total number of students in racial group in dis-
trict). 
260 The formula is: (average African-American access)/(average white access). 
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middle income and the average Latino student attends a school where 
only twenty-five percent of his peers are middle income, the Latino stu-
dent’s access to middle-income peers would be fifty percent that of 
whites. The study calculated the access of Latinos and African Ameri-
cans separately and found that they tended to experience similar levels 
of inequality in comparison to whites. Thus, for purposes of efficiency, 
simplicity, and clarity, the study combines African Americans and Lati-
nos into one group termed “minority” in presenting unequal access.261 
Moreover, this grouping of minority students is consistent with past 
practices of federal courts,262 as the relevant disadvantage is most often 
between minorities and whites rather than between minority groups. 
 It is important to note, however, this methodology cannot account 
for segregation that may be occurring at the classroom level. Minority 
students could be far more socioeconomically segregated than this Ar-
ticle’s study suggests because not all students necessarily come into con-
tact or equal contact with the middle-income students who are in their 
schools.263 It is not unusual for a minority student to be in a middle 
class school and still not have much exposure to middle-income stu-
dents because the student is assigned to classrooms that have high per-
centages of poor students.264 Thus, it is altogether possible that some 
districts that are not represented in this study as providing significantly 
unequal access are nonetheless creating problematic socioeconomic 
isolation in their classrooms.265 But that isolation is not evident because 
such schools maintain a relatively high level of socioeconomic integra-
tion at the school level. 
 The danger of overlooking important classroom segregation is 
highest in districts that have only one elementary, middle, or high 
school. In these districts, this study’s methodology would show minority 
                                                                                                                      
261 The formula is: (number of African-American and Latino students in School A) x 
(percentage of middle-income peers in School A) + (same formula for every school in 
district)/ (total number of African-American and Latino students in District) / (number 
of white students in School A) x (percentage of middle-income students in School A) + 
(same formula for every school in district) / (total number of white students in district). 
262 See, e.g., United States v. City of Yonkers, 833 F. Supp 214, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) 
(comparing Latino and African-American test results to those of whites and Asians); Com-
fort ex rel. Neumyer v. Lynn Sch. Comm., 283 F. Supp. 2d 328, 379–80 (D. Mass. 2003) (ex-
plaining why a desegregation plan that classified students as either white or non-white was 
appropriate in the city of Lynn). 
263 See Kevin G. Welner, Tracking in an Era of Standards: Low-Expectation Classes Meet High-
Expectation Laws, 28 Hastings Const. L.Q. 699, 702–03 (2001). 
264 Id.; see also Thomas Cnty. NAACP v. City of Thomasville Sch. Dist., 299 F. Supp. 2d 
1340, 1354–55 (M.D. Ga 2004) (finding racial disparities between ability groups). 
265 See Welner, supra note 263, at 703–08. 
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and white students as having the exact same level of access to middle-
income peers, even though they might not have equal access at the 
classroom level. Almost all districts, however, have more than one ele-
mentary and middle school and, thus, the segregation at the earlier 
grades is still captured by this data and partially—although not com-
pletely—prevents the single high school anomaly from entirely skewing 
the data. In short, the study can achieve its primary purpose of reveal-
ing the general problem of racially unequal access to middle-income 
peers, but cannot identify its exact contours and may understate ine-
quality in some instances. 
2. Racial Achievement Gap Changes in Relation to Racially Inequitable 
Access 
 The study’s second inquiry is whether racially differential access to 
middle-income peers corresponds with changes in racial achievement 
gaps on standardized tests. It examines both the achievement gap be-
tween whites and African Americans and the achievement gap between 
whites and Latinos. Nearly every school district in the country has a ra-
cial achievement gap, regardless of its integration level.266 Social sci-
ence would indicate that a significant portion of this achievement gap 
is attributable to demographic and local factors beyond the scope of 
this study.267 This study does not attempt to examine the role these oth-
er factors play and, instead, only attempts to measure the extent to 
which the achievement gap widens or narrows in districts where minor-
ity students have unequal access to middle-income peers. To do so, the 
study ignores the variation in overall achievement between districts. 
The fact that a district’s student population is high income and high 
performing, or low income and low performing, should have little ef-
fect on the study’s results. By ignoring the absolute levels of achieve-
ment between districts and instead analyzing the differential achieve-
ment of students within a district, the study is able to compare the 
achievement gap across districts in a way that is less subject to varying 
                                                                                                                      
266 See Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, supra note 8, at 44–51. 
267 See, e.g., Jaekyung Lee, Racial and Ethnic Achievement Gap Trends: Reversing the Progress 
Toward Equity?, Educ. Researcher, Jan. 2002, at 3, 6 (noting that the conventional factors 
affecting achievement are socioeconomic and family conditions, youth culture and student 
behavior, and schooling conditions and practices); Constantinos Papanastasiou, Internal and 
External Factors Affecting Achievement in Mathematics: Some Findings from TIMSS, 26 Stud. in 
Educ. Evaluation 1, 4–5 (2000) (claiming that external factors affecting achievement in-
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ground). 
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demographics and other factors across districts that affect overall abso-
lute achievement. 
 For example, only sixty percent of hypothetical District A’s white 
students and fifty percent of its African-American students might be 
achieving at grade level, whereas ninety percent of hypothetical District 
B’s white students are at grade level and seventy percent of its African-
American students. One might assume that District B is doing a better 
job of educating African Americans, but District A’s smaller achieve-
ment gap suggests this may not be true in all respects. District’s B’s 
higher test scores are likely attributable to higher funding, better 
teachers, or the fact that so many of its students are middle income.268 
Thus, although District B has higher scores, its larger achievement gap 
suggests that it may not be utilizing its resources in a way that promotes 
racial equity. In contrast, District B may not be a high-quality district on 
any number of measures, but its smaller achievement gap suggests that 
it is offering students an equal opportunity to benefit from those re-
sources that it does have. In short, this study’s methodology treats the 
fact that one district’s overall achievement is lower than another dis-
trict’s due to its demographics or other factors as irrelevant, focusing 
instead on whether a district’s student assignment policies correspond 
with changes in the racial achievement gap. 
B. Data Selection and Collection 
 Studying patterns of poverty isolation and racial inequality within 
districts presents a few challenges. The first problem is the sheer size of 
the data set. There are over 10,000 school districts, ranging in size from 
around 1000 students to over 100,000.269 Some of the relevant data for 
this study is not in a centralized database and requires pulling data 
from differing locations.270 Thus, a national study entails extensive 
                                                                                                                      
 
268 See Puma, supra note 217, at 78–79 (analyzing the effect of concentrated poverty on 
standardized test scores); Darling-Hammond, supra note 183, at 32 (“[W]hile student de-
mographic characteristics are strongly related to student outcomes at the state level, they 
are less influential in predicting achievement levels than variables assessing the quality of 
the teaching force.”); Rebell, supra note 100, at 1476–79 (analyzing the effect money has 
on educational outcomes). 
269 Common Core of Data (CCD), Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ 
ccd/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). 
270 Most of the relevant demographic details are in a national database. Build a Table, 
Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, http://nces.ed.gov/ccd/bat/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). 
But because the study relies on states tests, it required retrieving data from each individually 
and state data varied in its usability. For instance, in North Carolina, the achievement gap 
data was not available in a downloadable format but rather had to be gathered from each 
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work. The second problem is the variation in district structure. School 
districts in some states are organized on the county level, whereas other 
states have school districts that are neighborhood or city based.271 Dif-
fering structures can have a significant and misleading effect on the 
question of equal access to middle-income peers. Geographically small-
er school districts are more likely to have school populations that are 
both small and demographically homogenous.272 The converse is true 
of larger districts.273 To the extent a school population is small and rela-
tively homogenous, analysis of unequal access may be irrelevant. For 
instance, if all the students in the district attend the same elementary 
school, then by necessity they experience the same access. Likewise, 
regardless of the number of schools in the district, if almost all the stu-
dents in a district are of one socioeconomic class, there can be no un-
equal access. If districts with these characteristics were the exceptions 
rather than the general rule in a state, meaningful analysis of unequal 
access at the district level could still proceed. But in some states, smaller 
or community-based school districts are the norm, and significant seg-
regation tends to exist between districts rather than within them.274 Of 
course, the inequalities between homogenous districts are still subject 
to analysis, but that analysis is different in substance and would impli-
cate a different legal analysis than the one forwarded by this Article. In 
short, this Article’s legal analysis is based on unequal distribution of 
students within districts, which is more prevalent and noticeable in 
large and diverse school districts. 
 To ensure a data set manageable in size, this study limits its data 
collection to a sample (albeit a large sample). To avoid the problem 
that inter-district segregation would pose, this study intentionally col-
lects data from states where school districts are largely organized at the 
county level. Most southeastern states follow this pattern.275 But to test 
                                                                                                                      
district’s state report card. See Search Options, Educ. First N.C. Sch. Report Cards, http:// 
www.ncreportcards.org/src/ (last visited Feb. 19, 2012). 
271 North Carolina’s districts are almost all county districts. Thus, the State has only 
114 districts. Build a Table, supra note 270. Conversely, Pennsylvania organizes districts at 
the community level and has nearly 800. Id. 
272 See, e.g., John Charles Boger, Education’s “Perfect Storm”? Racial Resegregation, High 
Stakes Testing, and School Resource Inequities: The Case of North Carolina, 81 N.C. L. Rev. 1375, 
1424 (2003); Claudia Goldin & Lawrence F. Katz, Human Capital and Social Capital: The Rise 
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273 Goldin & Katz, supra note 272, at 694. 
274 Id. at 706–08. 
275 See Gary Orfield, Metropolitan School Desegregation: Impacts on Metropolitan Society, 80 
Minn. L. Rev. 825, 840 tbl.2 (1996). See generally Goldin & Katz, supra note 272 (using 
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the assumption that intra-district segregation would not be significant 
enough to provide meaningful comparisons to achievement gap 
changes in states with small districts, the study also includes states out-
side of the Southeast that have far more and far smaller districts. In to-
tal, this study includes six southeastern states—North Carolina, Ala-
bama, Georgia, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia—and five 
northeastern and midwestern states—Connecticut, Massachusetts, 
Michigan, Ohio, and Pennsylvania.276 
C. Study Results 
 Overall, the study revealed a serious problem with racially unequal 
access to middle-income peers within districts—a problem that stretches 
across all states. Some districts were providing access that was so unequal 
it was shocking. In four of the states, there were districts that provided 
whites twice as much access to middle-income peers as minorities. This 
is the difference between whites attending a solidly middle-income 
school, at seventy percent middle-income peers, and minorities attend-
ing a solidly poor school, at only thirty-five percent middle-income 
peers. A few districts even provided whites access that was three to five 
times that of minorities. The data also revealed that in several states a 
quarter of the districts were providing access that, although not shock-
ingly unequal, was disparate enough to create qualitatively different ex-
periences for white and minority students. And on the basic question of 
rough equality, in some states, only about half the districts provided 
equal access. In short, far too many school districts have student assign-
ment policies that place minority students at educational risk in com-
parison to whites and, thus, raise serious constitutional concerns. 
                                                                                                                      
276 In a few districts, the average minority student attended schools that had a higher 
percentage of middle-income students than the average white. Generally speaking, this 
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Access Compared to Whites: 121.7%); see also Sparta Area Schools, Michigan (Average 
Minority Access: 60%; Average White Access: 69%; Minority Access Compared to Whites: 
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1. Widespread Differential Access 
 Minority access to middle-income peers ranged from as low as 
twenty percent compared to that of whites in one district to equal ac-
cess in numerous districts. In a few districts, minorities’ average access 
to middle-income peers was actually higher than that of whites. Catego-
rizing districts offers a clearer understanding of this varying access. Ta-
ble 1 divides school districts into categories based on the amount of 
access to middle-income peers they offer minorities in comparison to 
whites. The column labeled “Access Below 50%” would capture, for in-
stance, a district where the average white student attends a school with 
seventy percent middle-income students and the average minority stu-
dent attends a school with less that thirty-five percent middle-income 
students.277 
 
Table 1: Percentage of Districts Providing Minorities Unequal Access to Middle-
Income Peers 
State Access Below 40% 
Access Below 
50% 
Access Below 
75% 
Access Below 
95% 
Access Below 
100% 
 Alabama 4.0% 8.0% 18.0% 38.0% 42.0% 
 Georgia 1.6% 2.7% 12.8% 34.8% 67.4% 
 Mississippi 0.0% 3.6% 15.3% 36.5% 63.5% 
 North Carolina 0.0% 0.0% 17.5% 68.4% 87.7% 
 South Carolina 0.0% 1.2% 8.5% 45.1% 69.5% 
 Virginia 0.0% 0.8% 3.1% 26.0% 74.0% 
 Connecticut 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% 13.0% 67.3% 
 Massachusetts 0.0% 0.0% 1.5% 9.2% 51.7% 
 Michigan 0.1% 0.5% 1.2% 13.6% 48.5% 
 Ohio 0.04% 0.6% 33.7% 52.5% 56.1% 
 Pennsylvania 0.2% 0.2% 1.6% 12.1% 56.3% 
Source: See infra Apps. A, B. 
 
 The “Access Below 40%” and “Access Below 50%” categories rep-
resent districts providing drastically unequal access to minorities. Dis-
tricts providing less than seventy-five percent access, likewise, provide 
significantly different experiences to minorities and whites, just not 
necessarily as stark. But as school districts approach 100% access, quali-
tative characterizations likely become less obvious, as some variation 
among schools will necessarily exist for practical reasons. This Article 
treats access at ninety-five percent or higher to be within the normal 
margin of variance and, thus, equal notwithstanding the small disparity. 
                                                                                                                      
277 See, e.g., Hamilton, OH (Average Minority Access: 35.9%; Average White Access: 
72.8%; Minority Access Compared to Whites: 49.35%). 
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Nonetheless, the study identifies the “Access Below 100%” as its own 
category because it does represent absolute equality. Interestingly, a 
quick review of Table 1 suggests states’ scores on absolute equity bear 
little relation to their scores in the lower categories that represent prob-
lematic inequality. 
 The data in Table 1 reveal significant variation across districts and 
states. All states have significant pockets of unequal access, but the 
pockets of inequality exist at different tipping points in different states. 
For instance, Virginia had the second highest percentage of districts 
providing less than numerically equal access in the South at seventy-
four percent, but it ranked the lowest on all the other categories. In 
contrast, Alabama had the most districts, by a large margin, that were 
providing minorities less than half of the access of whites. Yet, Alabama 
also had the most districts that were providing equal or nearly equal 
access. In short, Alabama appears to have a large number of both good 
and bad school districts, but fewer in between. 
 Differences between the regions also existed and sometimes were 
greater than those within them. Most notably, the northern states have 
relatively low numbers of unequal access. For instance, in two northern 
states, Massachusetts and Connecticut, not a single school district pro-
vided minorities less than fifty percent access and, in the three other 
northern states, less than one percent of districts provided less than 
fifty percent access.278 Likewise, in four of the five northern states, the 
percentage of districts providing less than ninety-five percent access was 
equivalent to the percentage of districts providing less than seventy-five 
percent access in the South. Thus, although there were significant 
numbers of districts providing unequal access outside the South, the 
inequality was less severe than in the South. 
 These regional differences, although statistically real, may be mis-
leading. As noted earlier, when significant segregation exists between 
districts, districts tend to be more internally homogenous and inequali-
ties are not fully captured by this study’s methodology.279 A careful re-
view of the data suggests that this is exactly what is occurring in the 
                                                                                                                      
278 Only one district out of over 600 districts provided less than fifty percent access in 
Pennsylvania. (Philadelphia City, 37% access). In Michigan, only four out of over 700 dis-
tricts provided minorities less than fifty percent access. (Vassar Public Schools, 27% access; 
Grand Rapids Public Schools, 40% access; Saginaw City School District, 43% access; Buena 
Vista School District, 44% access). In Ohio, only three out of 469 districts provided minori-
ties less than 50% access. (Ohio State School for the Blind, 26%; Lake Local, 39%; Perry 
Local, 49%). 
279 See Goldin & Katz, supra note 272, at 702. 
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northern states. First, the large number of districts and each district’s 
relatively small size appear to mask inequality in the North. Michigan 
has the most school districts of any state in the study at 734, and its ine-
quality in access is the lowest or nearly the lowest in every category.280 
Likewise, Massachusetts has 300 districts (even though its geographic 
size is less than a tenth of the size of Michigan).281 In the important 
category “Access Below 95%,” Massachusetts’s level is the lowest. 
 Second, when small northern districts are factored out, the differ-
ence between the North and South in racially equitable access disap-
pears. For instance, Ohio has 469 school districts, but many are very 
small and racially homogenous.282 In fact, only eighty-two of them have 
minority populations that are sufficiently large enough to report mi-
nority student achievement without violating privacy requirements.283 
When viewed at the district level, Ohio’s inequality in access is the 
highest in all but one category in the North, but is lower than southern 
states in most other categories. Yet if Ohio’s access is calculated at the 
county level, rather than at the district level, Ohio’s inequality of access 
nearly mirrors the South.284 In fact, calculated at the county level, Ohio 
would have the most unequal access of any state in the study in the cat-
egories of “Access Below 75%,” “Access Below 95%,” and “Access Below 
100%.” In short, the higher access in the North is likely attributable to 
smaller and homogenous districts rather than progressive student as-
signment policies. 
 Unfortunately, notwithstanding the foregoing differences in the 
extent of inequality, a consistent and reoccurring pattern of unequal 
access stretches across all states, as illustrated in Table 2. In fact, three 
troubling, but important, patterns arise. First, although relatively small 
in number, some districts are providing grossly unequal educational 
environments to minority and white students. For instance, Table 2 
                                                                                                                      
280 MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ, http:// 
www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475–-,00.html (click “MME Public 
Demographic Results—Spring 2010 to open document) (last visited Feb. 25, 2012). 
281 2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary 
Educ., http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/selectedpopulations.aspx?year=2009& 
mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y=7 (last visited Feb. 25, 2012) [hereinafter Mass 
Data]. 
282 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio Dep’t of Educ., http://ilrc.ode. 
state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (click “Racial/Ethnic” link to download data) (last visited Feb. 
25, 2012) [hereinafter Ohio Data]. 
283 See Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act of 1974, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2006). 
284 At the county level, 1.5% of Ohio districts provide less than 40% access, 4.5% less 
than 50% access, 28.4% less than 75% access, 59.7% less than 95% access, and 73.1% less 
than 100% access. 
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identifies several districts that assign whites to schools where their peers 
are sixty percent or more middle income, while assigning minorities to 
schools where the percentage of middle-income students ranks only in 
the teens or twenties. Within these single districts, whites and minori-
ties attend schools that, by the numbers, bear absolutely no resem-
blance to one another. 
 
Table 2: Districts Providing the Most Racially Unequal Access 
School District 
Average White 
Student’s Access to 
Middle-income peers 
Average Minority 
Student’s Access to 
Middle-income peers 
Minority Access as a 
Percentage of  
White Access 
 Atlanta Public Schools (GA) 73.20% 15.00% 20.50% 
 Mitchell County (GA) 48.80% 11.50% 23.60% 
 DeKalb County (GA) 66.70% 26.10% 39.10% 
 Bibb County (GA) 41.30% 17.70% 42.90% 
 Fulton County (GA) 82.60% 36.00% 43.60% 
 Hale County (AL) 67.10% 19.60% 29.30% 
 Marengo County (AL) 46.20% 13.70% 29.80% 
 Pickens County (AL) 61.30% 23.40% 38.20% 
 Tuscaloosa City (AL) 112.20% 44.40% 39.60% 
 Dallas County (AL) 32.80% 13.70% 41.70% 
 Franklin County (AL) 53.60% 23.30% 43.50% 
 Monroe County (AL) 51.30% 24.50% 47.80% 
 Lawrence County (AL) 63.70% 30.40% 47.80% 
 Philadelphia City (PA) 33.40% 12.50% 37.30% 
 Mahoning (OH) 66.00% 19.50% 29.60% 
 Summit (OH) 65.80% 29.50% 44.80% 
 Hamilton (OH) 72.80% 35.90% 49.40% 
 Cleveland (MS) 49.00% 21.00% 42.40% 
 West Jasper (MS) 48.00% 21.00% 43.10% 
 Greenwood (MS) 33.00% 15.00% 43.80% 
 Charleston (SC) 69.00% 31.10% 44.80% 
 Richmond City (VA) 58.40% 26.40% 45.10% 
 Source: See infra Apps. A, B. 
 
 Second, about one out of six districts in nearly half of the states 
provides minorities less than seventy-five percent of the access of whites 
to middle-income peers. This means that in a typical district, where on-
ly a third of the students are poor,285 whites would attend schools that 
                                                                                                                      
285 Thirty-five percent of students fall below 150% of the national poverty line, which is 
the typical indicator of low-income status. Children Below 150% Poverty 2010, Kids Count 
Data Ctr., http://datacenter.kidscount.org/data/acrossstates/Rankings.aspx?ind=46 (last 
visited Feb. 19, 2012); see also Susan Aud et al., Nat’l Ctr. for Educ. Statistics, The 
Condition of Education 2011, at 86–89 (detailing the percentage of school-age children 
living in poverty and the percentage of students by race in high-, middle-, and low-poverty 
schools). 
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are solidly middle class while minorities attend schools that are pre-
dominantly poor, the tipping point for educational barriers.286 
 Third, in all but five states, one-third to more than one-half of the 
districts provide minorities with unequal access (below ninety-five per-
cent). In districts that are solidly middle class or predominantly poor, 
unequal access alone may not produce significant changes in the edu-
cational environment, but in all of those districts operating on the 
margins, inequality in access is enough to make a negative impact on 
minority students and an opposite impact on white students. In short, 
an alarmingly large percentage of school districts are placing minority 
students at educational risk in comparison to whites. 
 Some districts, however, appear to be doing a good job of equally 
exposing students to middle-income peers. Surprisingly, at the state 
level, minority students’ exposure to middle-income students in com-
parison to whites is above ninety percent in all of the states studied ex-
cept North Carolina and Ohio.287 In fact, the statewide average access is 
above ninety-five percent in six of the states.288 This average is high be-
cause more than half of the districts provide equal or better access to 
minorities in all of the states except two, thus largely counterbalancing, 
on the statewide average, the inequalities created elsewhere.289 Yet the 
fact that so many districts are doing a relatively good job of providing 
equal access at the school building level makes the student assignment 
policies in other districts appear even worse. In effect, the large per-
                                                                                                                      
286 Kahlenberg, supra note 23, at 39–40 (explaining that researchers have defined 
high-poverty schools as those where fifty percent of students or more are eligible for free 
or reduced-price meals because students in these schools have far lower test scores than 
similar students in schools with smaller concentrations of poor students); Michael J. Pu-
ma et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., Prospects: The Congressionally Mandated Study of 
Educational Growth and Opportunity: The Interim Report 77 exh.1.51 (1993) 
(demonstrating a precipitous decline in student performance once the percentage of poor 
students reaches fifty percent); Puma, supra note 217, at 12 (“School poverty depresses the 
scores of all students in schools where at least half of the students are eligible for subsi-
dized lunch, and seriously depresses the scores when over 75 percent of students live in 
low-income households.”). 
287 North Carolina (Average Minority Access Compared to Whites: 88.7%); Ohio (Av-
erage Minority Access Compared to Whites: 87.5%). 
288 Massachusetts (95.2%); Virginia (95.6%); Connecticut (97.9%); Michigan (96.5%); 
Pennsylvania (96.7%); Mississippi (95.4%). 
289 Unfortunately, the percentage of districts providing equal access or better may be 
overstated in northern states in particular, where there are far more specially created 
school districts that cater to unique or small student populations and there is but one 
school in the district. Alternative schools for students who have been suspended are but 
one example. This study attempted, where appropriate and possible, to exclude special 
purpose school districts. 
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centage of districts providing equal access demonstrates, consistent 
with this Article’s argument, that racially unequal access to middle-
income peers is far from inevitable. 
2. Lower Access and Higher Achievement Gaps 
 Social science stresses the importance of access to middle-income 
peers because of the effect this access generally has on achievement.290 
The data in this study suggest that this principle holds true in the states 
analyzed. As a general matter, those districts with a racially equitable dis-
tribution of middle-income students tend to have smaller achievement 
gaps (as measured by the percentage of students achieving at or above 
grade level on the states’ end-of-year standardized tests). Those with the 
least racially equitable distribution of middle-income students tend to 
have larger achievement gaps. Figures 1 and 2 graph the achievement 
gap between whites and African Americans based on the level of access 
that minorities experience in comparison to whites in their district.291 
Figure 1: 
  
                                                                                                                      
290 See McUsic, supra note 9, at 1355–56. 
291 It is important to note that the number of districts represented in these charts is 
smaller than the number of districts in the previous tables because the achievement gap 
could not be calculated in several districts due to the unavailability of achievement data. 
Presumably the minority populations were too small for the districts to release the data. 
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Looking at the southern states, every state except Georgia and 
Mississippi shows a dramatic drop in the racial achievement gap from 
the districts with the most inequitable distribution to those with 
equitable distribution. Mississippi, however, is still consistent with the 
overall trend if one compares Mississippi’s “50–59%” access group to 
its equal access group (“<100%”). Between these categories, the 
achievement gap drops from 20.4 raw percentage points to 13 points. 
The nonconforming achievement gaps in Mississippi’s outlier districts 
would appear to be a result of demographic and data anomalies in a 
few districts, rather than an exception to the overall trend.292 
Figure 2: 
 
                                                                                                                      
292 In particular, Mississippi only has five districts providing less than fifty percent access 
to minorities. Those districts, however, are overwhelmingly poor and minority. For instance, 
Greenwood School District is eighty-four percent poor and whites are only seven percent of 
the student population. Thus, although whites have more access to middle-income peers 
than minorities, they still attend schools that are predominantly poor and predominantly 
minority. Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex2010.html#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
It is also worth noting that the achievement gap drop in Mississippi would be even lar-
ger were it not for anomalous districts that happen to provide minorities more access than 
whites. Mississippi has two districts where minorities are exposed to middle-income peers 
at twice the rate of whites. In those two districts, however, the actual percentage of middle-
income peers in the average minority student’s school is only eight percent and for whites 
it is only three percent. Thus, although the minority access is double that of whites, both 
groups attend schools that are more than ninety percent poor, and the real world differ-
ence is but a couple of middle-income students in each school. If the districts at this end of 
the spectrum were excluded, the achievement gap would drop from 20.4 to 8.5. 
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 Figure 2 illustrates that the northern states replicate the same gen-
eral trend as the southern states, with the achievement gap shrinking as 
equitable access to middle-income peers increases. The only inconsis-
tencies in this pattern are predictable. In particular, two northern 
states—Connecticut and Ohio— experience a significant uptick in the 
achievement gap once access for minorities increases beyond equitable 
(where minorities experience greater access than whites). These up-
ticks, like the one in Mississippi, correspond with unusual demographic 
populations in particular districts and/or insufficient data points in a 
particular category of districts. In Ohio, for instance, there are only 
three counties with valid data sets where minorities’ access is greater 
than whites, and two of those counties have extremely small minority 
populations.293 A very large achievement gap in the third skews the 
achievement gap upward, and that district is overwhelmingly poor and 
minority.294 In effect, just a few white students in this single school dis-
trict skew the average for the entire state. Similarly, in Connecticut, the 
presence of an enormous achievement gap in just a single school dis-
trict that is almost entirely white and middle income produces an unre-
liable variation in the achievement gap.295 Finally, some other minor 
deviations from the overall trend (of achievement gaps shrinking as 
access to middle-income peers becomes more equitable) exist in the 
North, but they appear anomalous. For instance, Pennsylvania’s overall 
trend is consistent with other states. Its increase in the achievement gap 
between the “50–59%” category and the “60–69%” category is attribut-
able to the very small number of districts that fall into these categories 
                                                                                                                      
293 Ohio’s achievement gap was calculated at the county level because the achievement 
gap was only available about a quarter of the time when calculated at the district level. The 
three counties referenced above the line are Medina, Warren, and Fairfield. Medina’s 
minority population is only 1.2% of the total, and Warren’s is only 3.5%. See Ohio Data, 
supra note 282. Such a small minority population may have other negative effects on 
achievement. Diversity studies, in particular, have focused on isolating effects for small 
groups and the need for a critical mass. See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 319–20 
(2003). 
294 The achievement gap in Medina was 16.6, whereas in the other two districts there 
was no achievement gap for African Americans. See Ohio Data, supra note 282. In fact, Afri-
can Americans slightly outperformed whites. See id. It is also worth noting that minorities, 
at only 1.2% of the population in Medina, were a small group in actual numbers ( just over 
300 total students). See id. When those students are spread across a few schools and several 
grades, very small fluctuations in the scores of individual students could affect the 
achievement gap metric. See id. 
295 See, e.g., Sterling, CN (16.8% Poor; 98% White; African-American-White Achieve-
ment Gap 34.8); Chester, PA (98% Minority; 88% Poor; Minority-White Achievement Gap: 
26.5). The achievement gap in the other district providing minorities equal or better ac-
cess was only 6.3% and well below districts providing inequitable access. 
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and the fact that some of them experience the same demographic 
anomalies discussed above.296 Although access disparities nonetheless 
exist in these districts, it is not particularly meaningful if one considers 
that the difference in one of the representative districts is between at-
tending a school with fifteen percent and seven percent middle-income 
peers, which is negligible at best. This study’s methodology, however, 
just so happens to identify such districts as supplying heightened access 
to minorities. In short, although a few anomalies exist, they are ex-
plainable, and the pattern of unequal access and heightened achieve-
ment gaps holds true in the North as well as the South. 
 This pattern is particularly significant given the premise that 
smaller and homogenous northern school districts would mask or 
make intra-district inequality less relevant. As noted above, northern 
district characteristics did appear to decrease the identifiable instances 
of inequality in comparison to the South. But the smallness and homo-
geneity of northern districts was far from sufficient to eliminate ine-
quality altogether or prevent relevant comparisons between achieve-
ment gaps across districts and regions. To the contrary, the instances of 
inequality were stark at times and reveal that the tendency toward ine-
quality of access to middle-income peers is strong enough that it tran-
scends otherwise important variables. These results only reinforce this 
Article’s constitutional focus on intra-district inequality, not just in the 
South, but across all regions. 
 Figures 1 and 2 reveal a troubling overlap between unequal access 
and achievement gaps, but they do not fully reveal how large the 
downward trend in the achievement gap is when minority students re-
ceive equal access. In Massachusetts, for instance, the average achieve-
ment gap between African Americans and whites, as measured on the 
state standardized exam, is generally very low across districts.297 Thus, 
the gap does not have far to fall, and the drop of 4.1 points does not 
visually appear large. Yet, as illustrated in Table 3, a 4.1 point drop in 
the achievement gap from the districts providing the least equitable 
access to middle-income peers to districts providing the most equitable 
access represents an 88.8% drop. In other words, the achievement gap 
is more than cut in half. In fact, a similarly drastic drop in the achieve-
                                                                                                                      
296 Only four districts are in the “50–59%” category in Pennsylvania (Erie: 54.12%; Ha-
zelton: 54.25%; Upper Darby: 58.4%; Steel Valley: 59.85%). And Erie, for instance, is 
eighty percent poor and majority white. Its black-white achievement gap is only 5.5 points, 
notwithstanding racially unequal access to middle-income peers, presumably because stu-
dents of all races are attending overwhelmingly poor schools. 
297 Mass Data, supra note 281. 
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ment gap occurs in all of the states except Georgia. In seven states, the 
achievement gap drop between inequitable-access districts and equita-
ble-access districts is more than fifty percent, cutting the achievement 
gap in half. Why Georgia’s African-American-White achievement gap 
does not significantly fall is not entirely clear,298 but interestingly Geor-
gia’s Latino-White achievement gap does drastically drop in these same 
districts. In fact, the achievement gap for Latinos entirely disappears at 
the point that they receive equal access to middle-income peers, and 
Latinos begin to outperform whites when they have more access to 
middle-income peers than whites.299 
 
Table 3: Change in African-American Achievement Gap Between Districts Providing 
the Most Equitable and Least Equitable Access 
State Raw Decline in Achievement Gap 
Percentage of 
Change/Decline 
 Alabama 7.5 59.8% 
 Georgia 0.007 0.1% 
 Mississippi* 11.9 58.3% 
 North Carolina 6 20.7% 
 South Carolina 7.3 51.4% 
 Virginia 8.1 51.3% 
 Connecticut 10.8 34.5% 
 Massachusetts 4.1 88.8% 
 Michigan 20.7 45.5% 
 Ohio 5.4 56.1% 
 Pennsylvania 3.6 52.1% 
 * Those few districts providing less than fifty percent access and those providing 100% or more 
access were excluded from Mississippi’s calculations in this table for the reasons discussed 
previously regarding the mathematical and demographic anomalies. The comparison in this table 
includes all of the districts in between. 
 Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C. 
 
 Although the foregoing analyses makes inequalities and achieve-
ment gaps within states and districts clear, comparisons between states 
are not obvious because each state uses its own exams and sets its own 
threshold for what constitutes passing.300 For instance, in Georgia over 
                                                                                                                      
298 As noted above the line, Georgia’s achievement gap includes two spikes and two 
drops. Thus, if one compares districts providing less than fifty percent access to those pro-
viding less than ninety percent, there is a significant drop in the achievement gap. The 
same is true if one compares those districts providing ninety to ninety-five percent access 
to those providing more access. Why there is a significant spike from those providing less 
than ninety percent access to those providing more is unclear. 
299 In the districts with the least access, the gap is 7.2, but falls to 4.5, 2.5, 3.2, 2, 2.5 
and -1.75 in the districts with more access. This drop amounts to more than 100%. 
300 See Ryan, supra note 216, at 241 (discussing how state standards for passing distort 
perceptions of academic success). 
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ninety percent of students pass or achieve at grade level on the end-of-
year exams, but in Connecticut the number is just over fifty percent.301 
All of the foregoing charts are subject to these fluctuations because 
they categorize districts by the amount of middle-income peer access 
they provide and then ask what the average achievement gap is in those 
districts. 
 By first identifying the districts with the largest achievements gaps 
and then calculating the average access in those districts, that problem 
is eliminated. The results, nonetheless, remain consistent with prior 
analyses. Those districts with the largest achievement gaps also have the 
least equitable access to middle-income peers, and those with the 
smallest achievement gaps have the most equitable access to middle-
income peers. In fact, while this method effectively eliminates the huge 
shifts, the trend itself is more uniform and consistent than the forego-
ing analyses. 
 
Table 4: Average Access Based on Achievement Gap Quartiles 
State 
Access in 
Bottom Quartile 
(Largest Achieve-
ment Gap) 
 
Access in 
Second Quartile
Access in 
Third Quartile 
Access in 
Top Quartile 
(Smallest Achieve-
ment Gap) 
 Alabama 86 90 104 98 
 Georgia 94 88 93 94 
 Mississippi 88 88 91 92 
 North Carolina 83 84 87 99.5 
 South Carolina 86 97 92 93 
 Virginia 90 87 93 97 
 Connecticut 91 89 94 98 
 Massachusetts 91 94 96 95 
 Michigan 94.8 95 98 100 
 Ohio 92 70 64 92 
 Pennsylvania 94.7 93 96 98 
Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C.  
 
 Table 4 divides districts into quartiles based on their district-wide 
achievement gaps. The districts with the largest achievement gaps pro-
vide less access than the districts with the smallest achievement gap in 
every state but Ohio. North Carolina’s differential is the most drastic, as 
those counties with the largest achievement gaps, on average, provide 
minority students access that is only eighty-three percent of what whites 
receive, while those districts with the smallest achievement gaps provide 
                                                                                                                      
301 Georgia (White Pass Rate: 97%; African-American Pass Rate: 90%); Connecticut 
(White Pass Rate: 63%; African-American Pass Rate: 43%). 
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minority students access that is almost equivalent to that of whites (99.5 
percent). In fact, the districts with the smallest achievement gap in sev-
en of eleven states provide minorities access that is ninety-five percent 
or higher. In the remaining four states, access for minorities still well 
exceeds ninety percent in districts with the smallest achievement gaps. 
Looking at the other end of the achievement gap spectrum, those dis-
tricts with the smallest achievement gaps are providing access, on aver-
age, that is below ninety-five percent that of whites. In short, equality of 
access, which this Article treats as ninety-five percent or more access, 
serves as a nearly uniform dividing line between districts with the high-
est and lowest achievement gaps. 
 Dividing districts by the quartile method used above clearly breaks 
districts out into rank order within the state, but a methodology based 
on quartiles can produce both huge and miniscule variations in the 
achievement gap that are not consistent across quartiles. For instance, 
those districts in the quartile with the largest achievement gaps in North 
Carolina had gaps ranging from 51.6% to 30.7%, whereas the achieve-
ment gaps in the middle two quartiles ranged from 30.5% to 25.1% and 
25.1% to 20.7%. 
 
Table 5: Average Access on Standard Deviations in Achievement Gap 
State 
More Than 
One Standard 
Deviation 
Above the 
Average 
Achievement 
Gap Score 
(Largest Gap)
Between the Average 
Achievement Gap 
Score and One 
Standard Deviation 
Above 
 
Between One 
Standard Deviation 
Below and the 
Average 
Achievement Gap 
Score 
Less Than One 
Standard 
Deviation 
Below the 
Average 
Achievement 
Gap Score 
(Smallest Gap) 
 Alabama 86 92 103 96 
 Georgia 90 92 92 99 
 Mississippi 87 89 92 90 
 North Carolina 88 85 89 111 
 South Carolina 74 95 93 91 
 Virginia 96 93 96 98 
 Connecticut 92 89 95 98 
 Massachusetts 92 89 96 92 
 Michigan 91 97 99 103 
 Ohio 77 63 86 92 
 Pennsylvania 99 95 97 98 
Source: See infra Apps. A, B, C. 
 
 Table 5 groups districts based on their standard deviation from the 
statewide average achievement gap, eliminating the problem of ran-
dom variations within the quartiles (although it also has the potential 
to result in small groups). The standard deviation model reveals some 
minor differences in individual states from the quartile method in Ta-
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ble 4, but overall the results are largely the same, with access at or above 
ninety-two percent representing a dividing line between districts with 
the highest and lowest achievement gaps. 
 In summary, this Article’s study of ten states revealed reoccurring 
instances of racially inequitable access to middle-income peers. In some 
instances, the inequitable access was so extensive that it amounted to 
white students attending predominantly middle-income schools and 
minorities attending predominantly poor schools. In most other in-
stances, the inequity was still large enough to expose white and minor-
ity students to significantly different peer environments. This inequity is 
not inevitable, but rather is likely a result of deliberate school assign-
ment policies, given that a substantial portion of districts in each state 
represent the opposite paradigm and provide minorities and whites 
equal access to middle-income peers. Although a more sophisticated 
analysis would be necessary to specifically identify the cause, the vary-
ing levels of inequity in access also coincided with varying racial 
achievement gaps. Consistent with other social science studies, this Ar-
ticle’s study found that in all states but one the largest achievement 
gaps exist in districts that provide the least equitable access to middle-
income peers, and the size of the achievement gap falls as access be-
comes more equitable. Equal access alone does not coincide with the 
elimination of the achievement gap, but it coincides with drastic reduc-
tions in the gap. The achievement gap dropped by approximately fifty 
percent or more in seven of the eleven states. 
Conclusion 
 Efforts to promote racial and socioeconomic equity through stu-
dent assignments have largely come to an end in federal court and only 
amounted to a few—albeit important—cases in state courts. The prob-
lems in federal court are tied to relatively well-settled negative prece-
dent, but the same is not true in regard to state claims. The failure of a 
movement to emerge in state court may be more the result of percep-
tion and strategy than doctrine and reality. Insofar as advocates and 
theorists have sought to use state constitutions as a way to avoid federal 
doctrinal problems or simply replicate federal claims in state court un-
der a new name, state-based theories of integration may confront the 
same political and practical limitations they would in federal court. 
Thus, although the theory of these integration claims may be valid in 
some states, it is no surprise that most advocates and the few courts that 
have heard the cases have been tepid. 
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 A halting past, however, does not foreclose the future of state con-
stitutions as an engine of racial equity in student assignments. Rather, it 
highlights the need for claims that are distinct from traditional integra-
tion and conceptually grounded in school finance precedent. This Ar-
ticle’s theory of equitable access to middle-income peers entails both. It 
is distinct in that equitable access to middle-income peers focuses on 
segregation within districts rather than between them and does not 
necessarily challenge historical district boundaries. Thus, it avoids many 
of the political and administrative complications that have undermined 
prior advocacy. Also, the focus on school-level segregation provides fac-
tually distinct circumstances. Local assignment policies fluctuate over 
time and involve conscious decisions, whereas state-level policy regard-
ing districts is more static.302 A more compelling set of facts naturally 
arises with the former. 
 A theory of equal access to middle-income peers proceeds at the 
district level, however, not simply to distinguish itself; it proceeds at the 
district level because it is there that it finds analytical and precedential 
strength. Courts may be quick to excuse inequalities that are beyond 
the control of districts,303 but they are far less willing to overlook those 
inequalities within districts’ control. Some inequalities that stem from 
the fact that a district is predominantly poor or minority may be largely 
beyond the control of local school districts. But other inequalities with-
in a district are often a result of district and school policies and, thus, 
are neither natural nor inevitable. Access to middle-income peers falls 
in this latter category of inequalities that are within districts’ control. 
 Once one understands that middle-income students are one of the 
many resources districts distribute, the equitable and strategic distribu-
tion of resources that school finance precedent has forced on schools 
and districts is directly implicated. Of course, no court has yet explicitly 
conceptualized middle-income students as resources, but a review of 
social science literature, as well as the differing academic achievement 
that accompanies exposure to middle-income peers, proves the con-
cept to be true. Courts already intuit this notion, heavily scrutinizing 
and condemning the prevailing poor performance of districts with 
concentrated poverty. And parents already act on it, often flocking to 
schools based more on the socioeconomic status of the students who 
                                                                                                                      
302 This, however, is not to say that states have not acted to change district boundaries 
in ways that increase segregation. See, e.g., Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438–40 (D. 
Del. 1975). 
303 Evans v. Buchanan, 416 F. Supp. 328, 352–53 (D. Del. 1976) (ordering inter-district 
desegregation remedy due to government manipulation of enrollment patterns). 
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attend them than the characteristics of the school facility or the particu-
lar staff who teach in them. Once explicit legal analysis catches up to 
reality and intuition, state constitutional education precedent will 
squarely apply. 
 This final step cannot occur soon enough. Far too many districts 
are depriving minority students of equal access to a key educational re-
source that will significantly affect their academic achievement. No sil-
ver bullets exist in education and much about student achievement is 
beyond the control of states, districts, and schools. Thus, simply provid-
ing equal access will not obliterate these outside factors. But equal ac-
cess can significantly mitigate their effects. No less than basic equality 
principles and state constitutional precedent demand as much. 
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Appendices 
Appendix A: Enrollment Data Sources 
State Source 
Alabama 2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Ala. St. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountability.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 
2012). 
Connecticut 2000–2010 Public School Enrollment by Resident Town, Conn. St. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://sdeportal.ct.gov/Cedar/WEB/ct_report/EnrollmentDT.aspx (last visited 
Feb. 28, 2012). 
Georgia 2009 Enrollment by Race/Ethnicity, Gender and Grade Level (PK–12), Ga. Dep’t of 
Educ., http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/owsbin/owa/fte_pack_ethnicsex.entry_form 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Massachusetts 2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & Secondary 
Educ. (ESE), http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/selectedpopulations 
.aspx?year=2009&mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y=7 (last visited Feb. 
28, 2012). 
Michigan MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475---,00.html (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Mississippi 2008–2009 Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss. Dep’t 
of Educ., http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex2010.html 
#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
North Carolina Disaggregated Performance Data for 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch., 
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (click link to download 
zip file) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Ohio 2008–2009 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio.gov, 
http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Pennsylvania 2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t of 
Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/community/school_ass 
essments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
South Carolina 2009 State Report Card, S.C. St. Dep’t of Educ., http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-
cards/2009/index.cfm (click each individual district to obtain data) (last visited 
Mar. 6, 2012). 
Virginia 2008–2009 Fall Membership Reports, Va. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/statistics_reports/enrollment/fall_membership/ind
ex.shtml (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
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Appendix B: Poverty Data Sources 
State Source 
Alabama 2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Ala. St. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountability.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 
2012). 
Connecticut 2008–2009 Students Eligible for Free/Reduced Price Lunch, Conn. St. Dep’t of 
Educ., http://sdeportal.ct.gov/Cedar/WEB/ct_report/Student 
NeedDTViewer.aspx (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Georgia 2009 Free and Reduced Price Meal Eligibility, Ga. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://app3.doe.k12.ga.us/owsbin/owa/fte_pack_frl001_public.entry_form 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Massachusetts 2008–09 Selected Populations Report, Mass. Dep’t of Elementary & 
Secondary Educ. (ESE), http://profiles.doe.mass.edu/state_report/select 
edpopulations.aspx?year=2009&mode=district&Continue.x=4&Continue.y
=7 (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Michigan 2008–09 Free and Reduced Lunch Counts, Michigan.gov, 
http://www.michigan.gov/cepi/0,4546,7-113-21423_30451_36965---,00.html 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Mississippi 2008–2009 Official Net Membership—First Month Enrollment (September), Miss. 
Dep’t of Educ., http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/CombIndex 
2010.html#pupil (last visited Mar. 6, 2012). 
North Carolina Dissaggregated Performance Data for 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch., 
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (click link to report 
to download zip file) (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Ohio 2009--2010 Disaggregated Data—Economic Status, Ohio.gov, http://ilrc. 
ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Pennsylvania 2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t 
of Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/comm 
unity/school_assessments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
South Carolina 2009 State Report Card, S.C. St. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://ed.sc.gov/data/report-cards/2009/index.cfm (last visited Mar. 6, 
2012). 
Virginia National School Lunch Program (NSLP) Free and Reduced Price Eligibility Report—by 
School Divisions 2008–2009, Va. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.doe.virginia.gov/support/nutrition/statistics/index.shtml  (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
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Appendix C: Achievement Gap Data Sources 
State Source 
Alabama 2008–2009 Alabama High School Graduation Exam, Math Scores, Ala. St. 
Dep’t of Educ., http://www.alsde.edu/Accountability/Accountabili 
ty.asp/ (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Connecticut 2008–2009 CMT Math G8 Achievement Test, eMetric, http://solutions1 
.emetric.net/cmtpublic/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 8, 2012).  
Georgia 2009 Georgia High School Graduation Test (Percent Passing in Math Scores), St. of 
Ga., http://archives.gadoe.org/ReportingFW.aspx?PageReq=211&PI 
D=61&PTID=67&CTID=217&SchoolId=ALL&T=0 (last visited Mar. 8, 
2012). 
Massachusetts 2009 MCAS High School Exit Tests: District Results, Mass.gov, 
http://www.doe.mass.edu/mcas/results.html?yr=2009 (last visited Feb. 28, 
2012). 
Michigan MME Public Demographic Results—Spring 2010, Mich. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://www.michigan.gov/mde/0,4615,7-140-22709_35150_47475---,00.html 
(click “MME Public Demographic Results —Spring 2010” to download file) 
(last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Mississippi 2008/2009 Subject Area Testing Program, Miss. Dep’t of Educ., 
http://orshome.mde.k12.ms.us/ors/assessment/2009/index.html#nclb (last 
visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
North Carolina State/LEA and School Test Performance 2008–2009, N.C. Pub. Sch., 
http://accrpt.ncpublicschools.org/docs/disag_datasets/ (last visited Feb. 28, 
2012). 
Ohio 2009--2010 Disaggregated School Data—Racial/Ethnic, Ohio.gov, 
http://ilrc.ode.state.oh.us/Downloads.asp (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Pennsylvania 2009–10 School Level Math and Reading PSSA Results—School Totals, Pa. Dep’t of 
Educ., http://www.portal.state.pa.us/portal/server.pt/co 
mmunity/school_assessments/7442/2009_- (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
South Carolina EOCEP (End-of-Course Examination Program)—2008–2009, S.C. St. Dep’t of 
Educ., http://ed.sc.gov/data/eocep/index.cfm (last visited Feb. 28, 2012). 
Virginia Virginia Assessment Results, Va. Dep’t of Educ., https://p1pe.doe. 
virginia.gov/datareports/assess_test_result.do (last visited Feb. 28, 2012).  
 
